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Secure Transmission of Sources over Noisy
Channels with Side Information at the Receivers
Joffrey Villard, Pablo Piantanida, and Shlomo Shamai (Shitz)
Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of source-
channel coding for secure transmission with arbitrarily correlated
side informations at both receivers. This scenario consists of an
encoder (referred to as Alice) that wishes to compress a source
and send it through a noisy channel to a legitimate receiver
(referred to as Bob). In this context, Alice must simultaneously
satisfy the desired requirements on the distortion level at Bob,
and the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper (referred to
as Eve). This setting can be seen as a generalization of the
problems of secure source coding with (uncoded) side information
at the decoders, and the wiretap channel. A general outer
bound on the rate-distortion-equivocation region, as well as an
inner bound based on a pure digital scheme, is derived for
arbitrary channels and side informations. In some special cases
of interest, it is proved that this digital scheme is optimal and
that separation holds. However, it is also shown through a simple
counterexample with a binary source that a pure analog scheme
can outperform the digital one while being optimal. According
to these observations and assuming matched bandwidth, a novel
hybrid digital/analog scheme that aims to gather the advantages
of both digital and analog ones is then presented. In the quadratic
Gaussian setup when side information is only present at the
eavesdropper, this strategy is proved to be optimal. Furthermore,
it outperforms both digital and analog schemes, and cannot
be achieved via time-sharing. By means of an appropriate
coding, the presence of any statistical difference among the side
informations, the channel noises, and the distortion at Bob can
be fully exploited in terms of secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a system composed of three nodes (or sensors)
where each one is measuring an analog source (or random
field) as a function of time. One of them (referred to as Alice)
wishes to transmit a compressed version of its observation to a
second node (referred to as Bob) through a noisy (or wireless)
channel. In addition, Bob can use his own observation as side
information to decode the received message and refine his
estimate of Alice’s source. The third node (referred to as Eve)
is an eavesdropper i.e., a node that can listen to the messages
sent by Alice through another noisy channel. Considering that
Eve is not to be trusted, Alice wishes to leak the smallest
amount of information about her source.
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Among some major information-theoretic issues, the above
scenario involves the notion of secrecy (and its application to
source and channel coding), source coding with side informa-
tion, as well as joint source-channel coding for transmission of
sources over noisy channels. The information-theoretic notion
of secrecy, introduced by Shannon [1], was first used for
secure communication over noisy channels by Wyner [2], who
studied the so-called wiretap channel. In particular, allowing
the encoder to introduce some independent random noise in
the transmitted signal, Wyner showed that it is possible to send
information at a positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as
the channel of the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the
legitimate user’s one. Csiszàr and Körner [3] extended this
result to the setting of general broadcast channels with any
arbitrary level of security, as measured by the equivocation
rate –the remaining uncertainty about the message– at the
eavesdropper. Extensive research has since been done, yielding
several extensions of the original wiretap channel [4]–[8].
On the other hand, source coding with side information
has been studied by Slepian and Wolf [9], and Wyner and
Ziv [10]. Security constraints with respect to an additional
eavesdropper that must be kept as ignorant as possible of the
transmitted source were recently introduced in these source
coding problems [11]–[14]. The optimal coding scheme has
been characterized in the general case [13], [14]. It uses
standard coding techniques (superposition coding, random
binning, etc.) as well as a new evaluation of the equivocation
rate at the eavesdropper. As a matter of fact, if the side
informations at the decoders are degraded, then Wyner-Ziv
coding [10] is optimal, while it is proved to be insufficient in
the general case.
As in the papers cited above, most of the existent work
separately considers channel or source coding for secure
transmission or compression. However, unlike point-to-point
communication problems [15], [16], there is no general result
of separation for multiterminal settings under security con-
straints. Recent work [17] considered such a setting of source-
channel coding for secure transmission by assuming that Eve
has a degraded channel with degraded side information with
respect to Bob, and shows that separation holds. Along the
same line of work, state amplification subject to masking con-
straints, where Alice wishes to effectively convey –amplify–
the channel state sequence to Bob while masking it from Eve,
has been investigated in [18]. This may indicate that digital
schemes are well-suited for these multiterminal settings with
security constraints. On the other hand, it is well-known that
joint source-channel coding/decoding is a must for broadcast
channels without secrecy constraints [19], [20], and hybrid
2digital/analog schemes have been proved useful for point-to-
point problems e.g., to handle SNR mismatch (while they can
perform as well as digital or analog ones at the true SNR) [21],
[22], as well as for some multiterminal settings [23]–[25]. By
taking advantage of both analog and digital strategies, they
may help to solve the considered problem for secure trans-
mission in the more general case without any degradedness
condition.
In this paper, we consider the setup of joint source-channel
coding for secure transmission of a source over a noisy channel
with an eavesdropper, and in the presence of side information
at the receiving terminals, as depicted in Fig. 1. This setting
can be seen as the unification of the problems of secure source
coding with side information at the decoders [13], [14], and the
wiretap channel [2], [3]. The main goal is to understand how
Alice can take simultaneous advantage of the statistical differ-
ences among the side informations and the channel noises to
reveal the minimum amount of information to Eve, and satisfy
the required distortion level at Bob. It should be emphasized
that the central difficulty of this problem lies in the evaluation
of the equivocation at Eve. As a matter of fact, the presence of
side information at the eavesdropper, that can be used together
with its channel output to estimate the source, prevents from
directly applying secrecy capacity results [3]. We derive a
general outer bound on the achievable region, referred to as
the rate-distortion-equivocation region, for arbitrary channels
and side informations. We then propose a pure digital scheme
which combines secure source coding [13], [14] with coding
for broadcast channels with confidential messages [3], and
derive the corresponding single-letter inner bound. These two
bounds do not match in general but we derive two results
of optimality when: (i) Bob has less noisy side information,
and (ii) Eve has less noisy channel. In these cases, separa-
tion holds and the optimal schemes reduce to a Wyner-Ziv
source encoder [10] followed by a classical wiretap channel
encoder [3], and a secure source encoder [13], [14], [26]
followed by a conventional channel encoder [15], respectively.
However, we show through a simple counterexample with a
binary source that a pure analog scheme can outperform the
digital one while being optimal. Then, restricting our attention
to the matched-bandwidth case, we propose a novel hybrid
digital/analog scheme that aims to gather the advantages of
both digital and analog ones, and derive its single-letter inner
bound. In the quadratic Gaussian setup when side information
is only present at the eavesdropper, this strategy is proved to be
optimal. Furthermore, it outperforms both digital and analog
schemes and cannot be achieved via time-sharing. We also
consider secure transmission of a binary source with BEC/BSC
side informations over a type-II wiretap channel. The proposed
hybrid digital/analog scheme turns out to be useful also in this
setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
states definitions along with the general outer bound on
the rate-distortion-equivocation region. Section III provides
a single-letter inner bound based on a digital scheme, as
well as special cases where separation holds. The proof of
the inner bound is given in Section IV. Transmission of a
binary source over a type-II wiretap channel is studied in
Section V, providing a counterexample for the optimality of
the digital scheme. A single-letter inner bound based on a
hybrid digital/analog scheme is provided in Section VI. The
proof is given in Section VII. Section VIII (resp. Section IX)
presents an application example to the transmission of a binary
source over a type-II wiretap channel (resp. a Gaussian source
over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side informations).
Section X concludes the paper.
Notation
For any sequence (xi)i∈N∗ , notation xnk stands for the
collection (xk, xk+1, . . . , xn). xn1 is simply denoted by xn.
Entropy is denoted by H(·), and mutual information by I(·; ·).
We denote typical and conditional typical sets by T nδ (X)
and T nδ (Y |xn), respectively (see Appendix A for details). Let
X , Y and Z be three random variables on some alphabets
with probability distribution p. If p(x|yz) = p(x|y) for each
x, y, z, then they form a Markov chain, which is denoted by
X−
−Y−
−Z . Notation A ⊥⊥ B is used to indicate independence
between the random variables A and B. Random variable Y
is said to be less noisy than Z w.r.t. X if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z)
for each random variable U such that U−
−X−
−(Y, Z) form a
Markov chain. This relation is denoted by Y X Z . The set of
nonnegative real numbers is denoted by R+. For each x ∈ R,
notation [x]+ stands for max{0 ;x}. Logarithms are taken in
base 2 and denoted by log(·). The binary entropy function is
defined on [0, 1] as h2(x) = −x log(x)−(1−x) log(1−x). Its
inverse h−12 is defined on [0, 1] and takes values in [0, 12 ]. For
each a, b ∈ [0, 1], a ⋆ b = a(1 − b) + (1 − a)b. The Bernoulli
distribution of parameter u is denoted by B(u).
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND GENERAL OUTER BOUND
A. Problem Definition
In this section, we give a more rigorous formulation of the
context depicted in Fig. 1. Let A, B, E , X , Y , and Z be six
finite sets. Alice, Bob, and Eve observe the sequences of ran-
dom variables (Ai)i∈N∗ , (Bi)i∈N∗ , and (Ei)i∈N∗ , respectively,
which take values on A, B, and E , resp. For each i ∈ N∗, the
random variables Ai, Bi, and Ei are distributed according to
the joint distribution p(abe) on A×B×E . Moreover, they are
independent across time i. Alice can also communicate with
Bob and Eve through a discrete memoryless channel with input
X on X , and outputs Y , Z on Y , Z , respectively. This channel
is defined by its transition probability p(yz|x).
Let d : A×A → [0, dmax] be a finite distortion measure i.e.,
such that 0 ≤ dmax <∞. We also denote by d the component-
wise mean distortion on An ×An i.e., for each an, bn ∈ An,
d(an, bn) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 d(ai, bi).
Definition 1 (Code): An (n,m)-code for source-channel
coding is defined by
• a (stochastic) encoding function at Alice F : An → Xm,
defined by some transition probability PF (xm|an),
• a decoding function at Bob g : Bn × Ym → An.
The rate of such a code is defined as the number of channel
uses per source symbol m
n
.
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Figure 1: Secure transmission with side information at the receivers.
Definition 2 (Achievability): A tuple (k,D,∆) ∈ R3+ is
said to be achievable if, for any ε > 0, there exists an (n,m)-
code (F, g) such that:
m
n
≤ k + ε , (1)
E
[
d(An, g(Bn, Y m))
] ≤ D + ε , (2)
1
n
H(An|EnZm) ≥ ∆− ε , (3)
with channel input Xm as the output of the encoder F (An).
The set of all achievable tuples is denoted by R∗ and is
referred to as the rate-distortion-equivocation region.
Remark 1: Region R∗ is closed and convex.
Remark 2: Quantities involved in Definition 2 only depend
on the marginal distributions p(ae), p(ab), p(y|x) and p(z|x).
The same applies for subsequent results that provide inner and
outer bounds on R∗.
B. General Outer Bound
The following theorem gives an outer bound on R∗ i.e., it
defines region Rout ⊇ R∗.
Theorem 1 (Outer bound): If (k,D,∆) is achievable, then
there exist random variables U , V , Q, T , X on finite
sets U , V , Q, T , X , respectively, with joint distribution
p(uvqtabexyz) = p(uv|a)p(abe) p(q)p(t|q)p(x|t)p(yz|x),
and a function Aˆ : V × B → A, verifying the following
inequalities:
I(V ;A|B)≤kI(T ;Y ) , (4)
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] , (5)
∆≤H(A|UE)−
[
I(V ;A|B)− I(U ;A|B)
−k
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
. (6)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Let us now give some intuition on Equations (4)-(5) and
(6). Equations (4)-(5) are the conditions for the transmission
and distortion of a standard source-channel coding problem.
The first term in (6), i.e., H(A|UE), corresponds to the
equivocation rate at Eve when the common message U can be
decoded. Let us assume that Q = T , in this case the remaining
terms capture the equivocation rate at Eve in terms of pure
source coding:
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)−
[
I(A;V |B)− I(A;U |B)
]
+
where the remaining information rate of Alice, i.e.,
I(A;V |B)−I(A;U |B), is directly subtracted from the equiv-
ocation rate, meaning that it is treated as "raw" bits of A. At
the same time, if T 6= Q the equivocation rate is increased
by the secrecy rate in the wiretap channel, provided that the
channel at Bob satisfies I(T ;Y |Q) > I(T ;Z|Q).
III. DIGITAL SCHEME
In this section, we propose a digital coding scheme for
secure transmission with side information and derive the
corresponding single-letter inner bound Rdigital (Theorem 2).
This scheme turns out to be optimal under some less-noisy
conditions (Propositions 1 and 2).
A. General Statement
The following theorem gives an inner bound on R∗ i.e.,
it defines region Rdigital ⊆ R∗. The achievability follows by
combining secure source coding of [13], [14] with coding
for broadcast channels with confidential messages [3]. This
scheme will be referred to as the digital scheme.
Theorem 2 (Digital scheme): A tuple (k,D,∆) ∈ R3+
is achievable if there exist random variables U ,
V , Q, T , X on finite sets U , V , Q, T , X ,
respectively, with joint distribution p(uvqtabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(abe) p(q)p(t|q)p(x|t)p(yz|x), and a function
Aˆ : V × B → A, verifying the following inequalities:
I(U ;A|B)≤ kI(Q;Y ) , (7)
I(V ;A|B)≤ kI(T ;Y ) , (8)
D≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] , (9)
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)−
[
I(V ;A|UB) , (10)
−k
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
. (11)
Proof: See Section IV.
Inequalities (7), (10) correspond to sufficient conditions
for the transmission of two source layers U , V in channel
variables Q, T , respectively. The first layer (U,Q) can be seen
as a common message which is considered to be known at Eve,
as shown by the term H(A|UE) in (11). The second layer
(V, T ) forms a private message which is (partially) protected
by adding an independent random noise [3], [7]. The term in
square brackets in (11) corresponds to the information that
Eve can still obtain on this protected layer.
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Figure 3: Proposed system (“operational” separation).
Notice that the inner and outer bounds Rdigital and Rout do
not meet in general:
• Condition (7) in Theorem 2, which is needed in our
scheme to characterize the equivocation at Eve, may not
be optimal in the general case (see Theorem 1).
• The Markov chain U −
− V −
−A−
− (B,E) is assumed
in Theorem 2 yielding
I(A;V |B)− I(A;U |B) = I(A;V |UB)
while only (U, V )−
−A−
− (B,E) is proved for arbitrary
codes in Theorem 1, for which
I(A;V |B)− I(A;U |B) ≤ I(A;V |UB).
We provide in Section III-C several cases where Rdigital is
optimal.
B. Coding Scheme Based On "Operational” Separation
In traditional separated schemes, two stand-alone com-
ponents successively perform source and channel coding,
as depicted in Fig. 2. However the scheme that achieves
region Rdigital does not satisfy this separation principle: The
source encoder outputs two layers which are further encoded
by using the channel code for a broadcast channel with
confidential messages [3] (see Section IV). This results in two
independent (but not stand-alone) source and channel com-
ponents yielding statistically independent source and channel
variables (as in [20] for Slepian-Wolf coding over broadcast
channels) i.e., “operational” separation holds (see Fig. 3). As
a matter of fact, inequality (7) in Theorem 2 prevents from
separately choosing variables U and Q which would maximize
the equivocation rate at Eve (11).
C. Special Cases
In this section, we characterize the optimality of the inner
bound Rdigital for some special cases.
1) Bob Has Less Noisy Side Information: If Bob has less
noisy side information than Eve i.e., B A E, the optimal
coding scheme reduces to a Wyner-Ziv source encoder [10]
followed by a classical wiretap channel encoder [3], and hence
separation holds (Fig. 2):
Proposition 1: If B A E, (k,D,∆) ∈ R3+ is achievable
if and only if there exist random variables V , Q, T , X on
finite sets V , Q, T , X , respectively, with joint distribution
p(vqtabexyz) = p(v|a)p(abe) p(q|t)p(t)p(x|t)p(yz|x), and a
function Aˆ : V × B → A, verifying
I(V ;A|B) ≤ kI(T ;Y ) ,
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆ ≤ H(A|E)−
[
I(V ;A|B)− k
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
.
Proof: The achievability simply follows from Theorem 2
by setting the random variable U equal to a constant value.
Whereas, the converse follows from Theorem 1 by noting that
the third inequality reads:
∆ ≤ H(A|UE) or
∆ ≤ H(A|V B) + I(A;B|U) − I(A;E|U)
+ k
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)
.
Since B A E, and U −
−A−
− (B,E) form a Markov chain,
I(A;B|U) − I(A;E|U) ≤ I(A;B) − I(A;E). Moreover
H(A|UE) ≤ H(A|E). In this case, the outer bound Rout
is thus included in (and consequently equal to) Rdigital.
If the informations at Eve (both side information, and
channel output) are degraded versions of Bob’s ones i.e., if
both Markov chains A−
−B −
−E, and X −
− Y −
−Z hold,
then Proposition 1 reduces to the results in [17]. In this case,
variable Q is set to a constant value, and T = X .
2) Eve Has Less Noisy Channel: If Eve has less noisy
channel than Bob i.e., Z X Y , the optimal scheme reduces to
a secure source encoder [13], [14] followed by a conventional
channel encoder [15], and hence separation holds (Fig. 2):
Proposition 2: If Z X Y , (k,D,∆) ∈ R3+ is achievable if
and only if there exist random variables U , V , X on finite sets
U , V , X , respectively, with joint distribution p(uvabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(abe) p(x)p(yz|x), and a function Aˆ : V ×B →
A, verifying
I(V ;A|B)≤kI(X ;Y ) ,
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆≤H(A|V B) + I(A;B|U)− I(A;E|U) ,
where it suffices to consider sets U and V such that ‖U‖ ≤
‖A‖ + 2 and ‖V‖ ≤ (‖A‖ + 2)(‖A‖+ 1).
Proof: The above region is achievable by setting Q =
T = X in Theorem 2. A new proof is needed to obtain the
converse part. Here, auxiliary variables are defined as follows,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
Ui = ( B
n
i+1, E
i−1, Y m) ,
Vi = (A
i−1, Bi−1, Bni+1, E
i−1, Y m) ,
Qj = ( E
n, Y j−1, Zmj+1) ,
Tj = (A
n, En, Y j−1, Zmj+1) .
Now, both Ui −
− Vi −
− Ai −
− (Bi, Ei), and Qj −
−
Tj −
− Xj −
− (Yj , Zj) form Markov chains (see Fig. 15).
Following the arguments given in Appendix C, we can define
new variables U , V , Q, T verifying the above Markov chains
5and the following inequalities:
I(V ;A|B) ≤ kI(T ;Y ) ,
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UB) + k
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)
.
Since Z X Y , and Q−
−T −
−X −
− (Y, Z) form a Markov
chain, I(T ;Y |Q) − I(T ;Z|Q) ≤ 0 and I(T ;Y ) ≤ I(X ;Y ).
This concludes the proof.
3) Secure Source Coding: Assuming that all terminals are
connected by a free-error link of finite-capacity R and defining
this rate by R , kI(X ;Y ), Proposition 2 provides as a special
case the single-letter characterization of the rate-distortion-
equivocation region in the setup of secure source coding with
uncoded side information given in [14, Theorem 3].
4) Wiretap Channel: Choosing appropriate side informa-
tions and auxiliary variables, region Rdigital reduces to the
achievable region for the wiretap channel [7, Eq. (2.6)]. To this
end, we simply set V to be a degenerated random variable and
define ∆−H(A|E) , Re where Re becomes the conventional
secrecy rate in the wiretap channel.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 (DIGITAL SCHEME)
Let U , V , Q, X be four random variables on finite
sets U , V , Q, X , respectively, such that p(uvqabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(abe) p(q|x)p(x)p(yz|x), a function Aˆ : V ×
B → A, and a tuple (k,D,∆) ∈ R3+. In this section,
we describe a scheme that achieves (under some sufficient
conditions) tuple (k,D,∆) i.e., for any ε > 0, we construct
an (n,m)-code (F, g) that verifies (1)–(3).
In this scheme, Alice compresses the source A in descrip-
tions (U, V ), with V on the top of U . In view of the side
information at Bob B, random binning a la Wyner-Ziv [10]
is performed. The corresponding bin indices (r1, r2) are then
mapped to indices (rc, rp), which are further transmitted to
Bob through variables (Q,X) using a code for broadcast
channel with confidential messages [3], where index rp is
protected by an independent random noise rf . As in the
classical wiretap channel [3], [7], its rate Rf satisfies some
constraint that allows to characterize the equivocation rate at
Eve.
Let ε > 0, R1, R2, Rc, Rp, Rf ∈ R∗+, S1 ≥ R1, S2 ≥ R2
such that
Rf < (k + ε) I(X ;Z|Q) , (12)
and assume that a local (independent and uniformly dis-
tributed) random source with rate Rf is available at Alice.
Define γ = ε9 dmax .
A. Codebook Generation
1) Source Codewords: Randomly pick 2nS1 sequences
un(s1) from T nδ (U) and divide them into 2nR1 equal size bins
B1(r1), r1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR1}. Then, for each codeword un(s1),
randomly pick 2nS2 sequences vn(s1, s2) from T nδ (V |un(s1))
and divide them into 2nR2 equal size bins B2(s1, r2), r2 ∈
{1, . . . , 2nR2}. See Fig. 4.
qm(rc)
2nRc
xm(rc, rp, rf )
2nRf
2nRp
Figure 5: Digital scheme–Channel codebook.
2) Channel Codewords: Randomly pick 2nRc sequences
qm(rc) from Tmδ (Q). Then, for each codeword qm(rc),
randomly pick 2n(Rp+Rf ) sequences xm(rc, rp, rf ) from
Tmδ (X |qm(rc)). See Fig. 5.
B. Encoding Procedure
Assume that source sequence An and random noise rf are
produced at Alice.
Look for the first codeword un(s1) such that
(un(s1), A
n) ∈ T nδ (U,A). Then look for a codeword
vn(s1, s2) such that (vn(s1, s2), An) ∈ T nδ (V,A|un(s1)). Let
B1(r1) and B2(s1, r2) be the bins of un(s1) and vn(s1, s2),
respectively.
Define the mapping (rc, rp) = M(r1, r2) ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRc}
×{1, . . . , 2nRp} where M is an arbitrary fixed one-to-one
(invertible) mapping and such that there exists a mapping M ′
recovering the message r1 from rc which is r1 = M ′(rc).
These two functions can be defined if:
R1 +R2 = Rc +Rp , (13)
R1 ≤ Rc . (14)
Notice that the second inequality does not have to necessarily
be an equality. Moreover, Alice then sends Xm = F (An) ,
xm(rc, rp, rf ).
C. Decoding Procedure
Assume that Bob observes Bn and receives Y m from Alice.
Look for the unique codeword qm(rc) such that
(qm(rc), Y
m) ∈ Tmδ (Q, Y ). Then look for the unique
codeword xm(rc, rp, rf ) such that (xm(rc, rp, rf ), Y m) ∈
Tmδ (X,Y |qm(rc)).
Compute (r1, r2) = M−1(rc, rp).
Look for the unique codeword un(s1) ∈ B1(r1) such that
(un(s1), B
n) ∈ T nδ (U,B). Then look for the unique code-
word vn(s1, s2) ∈ B2(s1, r2) such that (vn(s1, s2), Bn) ∈
T nδ (V,B|un(s1)).
Compute the estimate g(Bn, Y m) ∈ An using the following
component-wise relation, for each i = {1, . . . , n}:
gi(B
n, Y m) , Aˆ(vi(s1, s2), Bi) .
It is worth mentioning that given the indices (rc, rp) the
decoder is able to recover the messages (r1, r2). In addition
to this, given the common index rc the decoder is enable to
recover at least the message r1.
6un(s1)
2nR1
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2nR2
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Figure 4: Digital scheme–Source codebook.
D. Errors and Constraints
Denoting by E the event “An error occurred during the
encoding or decoding steps,” we expand its probability (av-
eraged over the set of all possible codebooks) as follows:
Pr {E} ≤ Pt,1+Pt,2+Pe,1+Pe,2+Pd,1+Pd,2+Pd,3+Pd,4,
where each term corresponds to a particular error event,
as detailed below. We derive sufficient conditions on the
parameters that make each of these probabilities small for
some sufficiently large n. From now on, let m = ⌊n(k+ ε)⌋.1
1) Typicality: From standard properties of typical se-
quences (see Appendix A), there exists a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0
such that Pt,1 , Pr {(An, Bn, En) 6∈ T nδ (A,B,E)} ≤ ηn.
Consequently, Pt,1 ≤ γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, since the input of the channel Xm is set
to some codeword xm(rc, rp, rf ) ∈ Tmδ (X), Pt,2 ,
Pr {(Xm, Y m, Zm) 6∈ Tmδ (X,Y, Z)} ≤ γ for some suffi-
ciently large n.
2) Encoding: In the first encoding step, Alice needs to
find (at least) one codeword un(s1) such that (un(s1), An) ∈
T nδ (U,A). Following standard argument (see e.g. [14, Ap-
pendix B-F-2]), we can prove that if S1 > I(U ;A), then the
probability that this step fails Pe,1 can be upper bounded by
γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, the second encoding step succeeds with probabil-
ity 1− Pe,2 ≥ 1− γ under condition S2 > I(V ;A|U).
3) Decoding Indices: In the first decoding step, Bob looks
for the unique codeword qm(rc) such that (qm(rc), Y m) ∈
Tmδ (Q, Y ). Following standard argument for channel coding,
we can prove that if Rc < (k+ε)I(Q;Y ), then the probability
that there exists another admissible codeword Pd,1 can be
lowered below γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, the second encoding step succeeds with prob-
ability 1 − Pd,2 ≥ 1 − γ under condition Rp + Rf <
(k + ε)I(X ;Y |Q).
4) Decoding Source Variables: In the third decoding step,
Bob looks for the unique codeword un(s1) ∈ B1(r1) such
that (un(s1), Bn) ∈ T nδ (U,B). Following standard argument
for source coding (see e.g. [14, Appendix B-F-4]), we can
prove that if S1 − R1 < I(U ;B), then the probability that
there exists another admissible codeword Pd,3 can be lowered
below γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, the fourth decoding step succeeds with probability
1− Pd,4 ≥ 1− γ under condition S2 −R2 < I(V ;B|U).
5) Summary: In this paragraph, we proved that under some
sufficient conditions, Pr {E} ≤ 8γ.
1Note that m→∞ as n→∞.
E. Distortion at Bob
We now check that our code achieves the required distortion
level at Bob (averaged over the set of all possible codebooks):
E
[
d
(
An, g(Bn, Y m)
)] ≤ (1− Pr {E})
× E
[
d
(
An, Aˆ
(
vn(s1, s2), B
n
))∣∣∣✁E]
+ Pr {E} dmax
≤ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] + ε
9
+
8ε
9
,
where the last inequality holds for some sufficiently large
n, and follows from Pr {E} ≤ 8γ, the definition of γ, and
standard argument in rate-distortion theory from the fact that
(An, vn(s1, s2), B
n) ∈ T nδ (A, V,B) when no error occured
(see e.g. [14, Appendix B-G]).
Condition D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] is thus sufficient to
achieve distortion D + ε at Bob.
F. Equivocation Rate at Eve
In the following paragraphs, we prove a lower bound on
the equivocation rate at Eve. We first split up the equivocation
into two terms which will be studied separately:
H(An|EnZm) = H(An|rc, rpEnZm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Es
+ I(An; rc, rp|EnZm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ec
.
(15)
1) Study of Es: The “source” term Es can be written as:
Es
(a)
= H(An|r1, r2En)
(b)
= H(An|r1En)−H(r2|r1En)
= H(An|r1En)−H(r2) + I(r2; r1En)
≥ H(An|r1, s1En)−H(r2) + I(r2;En|r1) + I(r2; r1)
≥ H(An|s1En)−H(r2) + I(r2;En|r1)
(c)
≥ nH(A|UE)− n ε4 − nR2 + I(r2;En|r1) , (16)
where
• step (a) follows from the Markov chain An −
−
(rc, rp, E
n)−
−Zm and the identity (rc, rp) = M(r1, r2)
where M is a one-to-one mapping,
• step (b) from the fact that the bin index r2 is a determin-
istic function of An,
• step (c) from the fact that the codewords un(s1) are
drawn i.i.d., for some sufficiently large n (see [14,
Lemma 6]), the fact that r2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}, and the
non-negativity of mutual information.
7Note that this term corresponds to the one studied in
[14, Appendix B-H]. The above lower bound should how-
ever be tighter since we do not neglect the remainder term
I(r2;E
n|r1).
2) Study of Ec: The “channel” term Ec can be written as:
Ec = H(rc, rp|EnZm)
= H(rp|rcZm) +H(rc|Zm)− I(rc, rp;En|Zm) ,(17)
where the first step follows from the fact that (rc, rp) is a
deterministic function of An.
The first term of the r.h.s. of (17) corresponds to the equiv-
ocation (of the private message, given the common message
and the output of the channel) in the wiretap channel setting.
Following the arguments of [3, Section IV], [7, Section 2.3],
we can easily prove the following lower bound:
H(rp|rcZm) ≥ n(Rp+Rf)−mI(X ;Z|Q)− 1−n ε2 , (18)
for some sufficiently large m. This proof relies on (i) def-
inition Xm = xm(rc, rp, rf ), (ii) the fact that codewords
xm(rc, rp, rf ) are nearly uniformly distributed (given rc) over
a set of cardinality 2n(Rp+Rf ), (iii) the fact that the channel
X 7→ Z is memoryless, (iv) Fano’s inequality together
with constraint (12), which ensures that Eve can decode
xm(rc, rp, rf ) from (rp, rf ) with an arbitrarily small prob-
ability of error, (v) standard properties of typical sequences,
and (vi) the Markov chain Q −
−X −
− Z .
3) End of Proof: Gathering (15)–(18), we proved that:
H(An|EnZm)≥ nH(A|UE)− nR2 + n(Rp +Rf )
−mI(X ;Z|Q) + I(r2;En|r1) +H(rc|Zm)
−I(rc, rp;En|Zm)− n 3ε4 − 1 . (19)
We now study the remainder of the r.h.s. of the above
inequality:
I(r2;E
n|r1) +H(rc|Zm)− I(rc, rp;En|Zm)
= I(r1, r2;E
n)− I(r1;En) +H(rc|Zm)
− I(Zmrc, rp;En) + I(Zm;En)
(a)
= − I(r1;En) +H(rc|Zm)− I(Zm;En|rc, rp)
+ I(Zm;En)
(b)
= − I(r1;En) + I(rcZm;En) +H(rc|EnZm)
(c)
≥ 0 ,
where
• step (a) follows from the identity (rc, rp) = M(r1, r2)
where M is a one-to-one mapping,
• step (b) follows by noting that I(Zm;En|rc, rp) = 0
because En−
−(rc, rp)−
−Zm form a Markov chain since
the outputZm only depends on (An, En, Bn) through the
messages (rc, rp) sent by the channel encoder,
• step (c) from the fact that r1 = M ′(rc) for some mapping
M ′, and the non-negativity of conditional entropy and
mutual information.
Inequality (19) then yields
1
n
H(An|EnZm) ≥ H(A|UE)−R2 +Rp +Rf
− m
n
I(X ;Z|Q)− ε ,
for some sufficiently large n.
Condition ∆ ≤ H(A|UE) − R2 + Rp + Rf − (k +
ε)I(X ;Z|Q) is thus sufficient to achieve equivocation rate
∆− ε.
G. Summary of Sufficient Conditions
Putting all pieces together, we proved that the following
inequalities are sufficient conditions for a tuple (k,D,∆) ∈
R
3
+ to be achievable: For each ε > 0,
R1, R2, Rc, Rp, Rf > 0
R1 +R2 = Rc +Rp
R1 ≤ Rc
S1 ≥ R1
S2 ≥ R2
S1 > I(U ;A)
S2 > I(V ;A|U)
Rc < (k + ε)I(Q;Y )
Rp +Rf < (k + ε)I(X ;Y |Q)
S1 −R1 < I(U ;B)
S2 −R2 < I(V ;B|U)
Rf < (k + ε)I(X ;Z|Q)
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))]
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)−R2 +Rp +Rf
− (k + ε)I(X ;Z|Q)
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination [27], it is straightfor-
ward to prove that this system of inequalities is equivalent
to: 
I(U ;A|B) < (k + ε)I(Q;Y )
I(V ;A|B) < (k + ε)I(X ;Y )
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))]
∆ < H(A|UE)
∆ < H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UB)
+ (k + ε)
(
I(X ;Y |Q)− I(X ;Z|Q)
)
H. Channel Prefixing
For each random variable T on some finite set T such that
T −
− X −
− (Y, Z) form a Markov chain, we can use the
above scheme considering the DMC T 7→ (Y, Z) instead of
X 7→ (Y, Z). In this case, the above sufficient conditions write
I(U ;A|B) < (k + ε)I(Q;Y )
I(V ;A|B) < (k + ε)I(T ;Y )
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))]
∆ < H(A|UE)
∆ < H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|UB)
+ (k + ε)
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)
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Figure 6: Binary source with BEC/BSC side informations.
A−
−B −
−E B A E I(A;B) ≥ I(A;E)
0 2ǫ 4ǫ(1− ǫ) h2(ǫ) β
Figure 7: Relative properties of the side informations as a
function of (β, ǫ).
Since region R∗ is closed, this proves Theorem 2.
V. SECURE TRANSMISSION OF A BINARY SOURCE WITH
BEC/BSC SIDE INFORMATIONS OVER A TYPE-II WIRETAP
CHANNEL
A. System Model
Consider the source model depicted in Fig. 6, where the
source is binary uniformly distributed (A ∼ B ( 12)). The side
information at Bob is the output of a binary erasure channel
(BEC) with erasure probability β ∈ (0, 1] and input A. The
side information at Eve is the output of a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with crossover probability ǫ ∈ [0, 12 ] and input
A. Recall that according to the values of the parameters (β, ǫ),
the side informations satisfy the properties summarized in
Fig. 7 [28].
The communication channel is similar to the type-II wiretap
channel of [2]: It consists of a noiseless channel from Alice
to Bob, and a BSC with crossover probability ζ ∈ [0, 12 ], from
Alice to Eve (see Fig. 8).
In this section, we focus on lossless reconstruction at Bob (d
is the Hamming distance and D = 0) and matched bandwidth
(k = 1).
B. Performance of Coding Schemes
From the general outer bound of Theorem 1, we can easily
derive the following result.
Proposition 3 (Outer bound): If (k = 1, D = 0,∆) is
achievable, then there exist u, q ∈ [0, 12 ] such that
∆≤h2(ǫ) + h2(u)− h2(ǫ ⋆ u)
−
[
βh2(u)−
(
h2(ζ) + h2(q)− h2(ζ ⋆ q)
)]
+
.
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of the converse
part of Proposition 4 below, given in Appendix D. Details are
omitted.
The following proposition provides a simple expression of
region Rdigital.
X = Y
0
1
Z
0
1
1− ζ
ζ
ζ
1− ζ
Figure 8: Type-II wiretap channel.
Proposition 4 (Digital scheme): (k = 1, D = 0,∆) ∈
Rdigital if and only if there exist u, q ∈ [0, 12 ] such that
β(1 − h2(u))≤1− h2(q) ,
∆≤h2(ǫ) + h2(u)− h2(ǫ ⋆ u)
−
[
βh2(u)−
(
h2(ζ) + h2(q)− h2(ζ ⋆ q)
)]
+
.
Proof: The proof of the converse part is given in Ap-
pendix D.
The direct part follows from Theorem 2 after some straight-
forward manipulations choosing auxiliary variables as follows
(details are omitted): V = A; X ∼ B ( 12); U (resp. Q) is the
output of a BSC with crossover probability u ∈ [0, 12 ] (resp.
q ∈ [0, 12 ]) and input A (resp. X).
Notice that if β ≤ 4ǫ(1 − ǫ), then B A E (see Fig. 7),
and hence Proposition 1 holds i.e., the above inner bound is
optimal and separation holds.
In the following, we will compare the above digital scheme
with a pure analog one, consisting in directly sending the
source over the channel. Its performance is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Analog scheme): A tuple (k = 1, D =
0,∆) ∈ R3+ is achievable through an analog scheme if
∆ ≤ h2(ǫ) + h2(ζ) − h2(ζ ⋆ ǫ) .
Proof: Letting X = A yields zero distortion at Bob (since
Y = X) and equivocation rate H(A|EZ) at Eve. The above
expression follows after some straightforward manipulations.
Details are omitted.
C. Counterexample for the Optimality of Theorem 2
Let now assume that Bob does not have any side information
i.e., B = ∅ or equivalently β = 1, and let ǫ = ζ = 0.1, so that
A−
−E −
−B and X −
− Y −
− Z form Markov chains, and
neither Proposition 1, nor Proposition 2 applies.
This setting provides a counterexample for the general
optimality of the inner bound in Theorem 2: Numerical
optimization over u and q in Proposition 4 indicates that
the proposed digital scheme achieves an equivocation rate
∆ = 0.056, while the naive analog scheme of Proposition 5
achieves ∆ = 0.258. Furthermore, the latter coincides with
the outer bound of Proposition 3. This shows that a joint
source-channel scheme may achieve better performance in
some cases.
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Figure 9: Alice and Bob as a system with state-dependent
channel and CSIT.
VI. HYBRID CODING
Based on the observations of the previous section about
the usefulness of analog schemes, we propose in this section
a hybrid digital/analog scheme that yields a new single-
letter inner bound Rhybrid in the matched-bandwidth case
(Theorem 3).
A. General Statement
Channels A 7→ B and X 7→ Y can be viewed together
as a state-dependent channel with input X , state A and
output (B, Y ). In this perspective, Alice and Bob form a
communication system with channel state information non-
causally known at the transmitter (CSIT), as depicted in Fig. 9.
Roughly speaking, the proposed scheme consists in sending
independent digital random noise rf using a Gelfand-Pinsker
code [29] for this equivalent state-dependent channel.
Theorem 3 (Hybrid scheme): A tuple (k = 1, D,∆) ∈ R3+
is achievable if there exist random variables U , V , X on
finite sets U , V , X , with joint distribution p(uvabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(vx|a)p(abe)(yz|x), x = x(v, a), and a function
Aˆ : V × B × Y → A, verifying
I(U ;A)≤I(U ;BY ) , (20)
I(V ;A|U)≤I(V ;BY |U) , (21)
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))] , (22)
∆≤H(A|UE)− I(V ;A|U)− I(X ;Z|UE)
+min
{
I(V ;BY |U) ; I(V ;AZ|U)
}
. (23)
Proof: See Section VII.
Inequalities (20), (21) correspond to sufficient conditions
for the transmission of descriptions U , V of A. The first layer
U can be seen as a common message which is considered to
be known at Eve, as shown by the term H(A|UE) in (23).
Digital random noise rf helps to secure the second layer V
against Eve.
B. Special Cases
1) Analog Schemes: The proposed scheme can reduce to a
pure analog one (as the simple one of Proposition 5). Hence,
Rhybrid contains tuples that may not be in Rdigital: Rhybrid 6⊂
Rdigital.
2) Digital Schemes: By defining the variables in Theorem 3
as pairs of independent source and channel components, we
can obtain the structure of those in Theorem 2, but such vari-
ables do not verify all inequalities and thus Rdigital 6⊂ Rhybrid.
3) Wiretap Channel: Choosing independent source and
channel variables with appropriate rates, regionRhybrid reduces
to the achievable region for the wiretap channel [7, Eq. (2.6)].
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 (HYBRID SCHEME)
Let U , V , X be three random variables on finite
sets U , V , X , respectively, such that p(uvabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(vx|a)p(abe)p(yz|x), x = x(v, a), a function Aˆ : V ×
B × Y → A, and a tuple (D,∆) ∈ R2+. In this section,
we describe a scheme that achieves (under some sufficient
conditions) tuple (k = 1, D,∆) i.e., for any ε > 0, we
construct an (n, n)-code (F, g) such that:
E
[
d
(
An, g(Bn, Y n)
)] ≤ D + ε ,
1
n
H(An|EnZn) ≥ ∆− ε .
In this scheme, Alice compresses the source A in descrip-
tions (U, V ), with V on the top of U . Digital random noise
rf is also transmitted on V (a la Gelfand-Pinsker) to take
advantage of the possibly better quality of Bob’s channel, and
prevent Eve from decoding the whole message. As in the
classical wiretap channel [3], [7], its rate Rf satisfies some
constraint that allows to characterize the equivocation rate at
Eve. Alice finally sends some deterministic function x(V,A)
of V and A.
Let ε > 0, R1, R2, Rf ∈ R∗+ such that
R2 +Rf < I(V ;AZ|U) , (24)
and assume that a local (independent and uniformly dis-
tributed) random source with rate Rf is available at Alice.
Define γ = ε7 dmax .
A. Codebook Generation
Randomly pick 2nR1 sequences un(r1) from T nδ (U). Then,
for each codeword un(r1), randomly pick 2n(R2+Rf ) se-
quences vn(r1, r2, rf ) from T nδ (V |un(r1)). See Fig. 10.
B. Encoding Procedure
Assume that source sequence An and random noise rf are
produced at Alice.
Look for the first codeword un(r1) such that (un(r1), An) ∈
T nδ (U,A). Then look for the first codeword vn(r1, r2, rf ) such
that (vn(r1, r2, rf ), An) ∈ T nδ (V,A|un(r1)).
Alice then sends Xn = F (An) defined by the following
component-wise relation, for each i = {1, . . . , n}:
Xi , x(vi(r1, r2, rf ), Ai) .
It is worth mentioning here that this scheme, as opposed to
the pure digital scheme in Theorem 2, does not use binning.
The reason for this is that it is not needed since decoding at
the destination (Bob) is jointly performed over both the side
information and the channel output creating the same effect
than binning (similar conclusions are drawn in [20]).
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Figure 10: Hybrid scheme–Codebook.
C. Decoding Procedure
Assume that Bob observes Bn and receives Y n from Alice.
Look for the unique codeword un(r1) such that
(un(r1), B
n, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y ). Then look for the
unique vn(r1, r2, rf ) such that (vn(r1, r2, rf ), Bn, Y n) ∈
T nδ (V,B, Y |un(r1)).
Compute the estimate g(Bn, Y n) ∈ An using the following
component-wise relation, for each i = {1, . . . , n}:
gi(B
n, Y n) , Aˆ(vi(r1, r2, rf ), Bi, Yi) .
D. Errors and Constraints
Denoting by E the event “An error occurred during the
encoding or decoding steps,” we expand its probability (av-
eraged over the set of all possible codebooks) as follows:
Pr {E} ≤ Pt,1 + Pt,2 + Pe,1 + Pe,2 + Pd,1 + Pd,2, where
each term corresponds to a particular error event, as detailed
below. We derive sufficient conditions on the parameters that
make each of these probabilities small.
1) Typicality: From standard properties of typical se-
quences (see Appendix A), there exists a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0
such that Pt,1 , Pr {(An, Bn, En) 6∈ T nδ (A,B,E)} ≤ ηn.
Consequently, Pt,1 ≤ γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, since the input of the channel Xn is typical
(when no error occurs during the encoding steps), Pt,2 ,
Pr {(Xn, Y n, Zn) 6∈ T nδ (X,Y, Z)} ≤ γ for some sufficiently
large n.
2) Encoding: In the first encoding step, Alice needs to
find (at least) one codeword un(r1) such that (un(r1), An) ∈
T nδ (U,A). Following standard argument (see e.g. [14, Ap-
pendix B-F-2], we can prove that if R1 > I(U ;A), then the
probability that this step fails Pe,1 can be upper bounded by
γ for some sufficiently large n.
Similarly, the second encoding step succeeds with probabil-
ity 1− Pe,2 ≥ 1− γ under condition R2 > I(V ;A|U).
3) Decoding: In the first decoding step, Alice should find
the unique codeword un(r1) such that (un(r1), Bn, Y n) ∈
T nδ (U,B, Y ). The corresponding error probability Pd,1 must
be carefully handled.
As previously noted in [30] and [24], the conventional
random coding proof technique does not apply here. In the
proposed joint coding scheme, a single codebook plays both
roles of source and channel codebooks. For a given source
sequence an, the indices (r1, r2) thus depend on the entire
codebooks, and the averaging over the set of all possible
codebooks cannot be performed in the usual way. Similarly
to [24], we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1: There exists κ < 1 and a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0
such that
Pd,1 ≤ 2
n(R1−I(U ;BY )+ηn)
(1− κ)2 ,
for some sufficiently large n.
Proof: See Appendix E.
From Lemma 1, if R1 < I(U ;BY ), then probability Pd,1
vanishes as n tends to infinity, and hence can be upper bounded
by γ for some sufficiently large n.
Using similar arguments, we can prove that the second
decoding step succeeds with probability 1 − Pd,2 ≥ 1 − γ
under condition R2 +Rf < I(V ;BY |U).
4) Summary: In this paragraph, we proved that under some
sufficient conditions, Pr {E} ≤ 6γ.
E. Distortion at Bob
We now check that our code achieves the required distortion
level at Bob (averaged over the set of all possible codebooks):
E
[
d
(
An, g(Bn, Y n)
)]
≤ (1− Pr {E})
×E
[
d
(
An, Aˆ
(
vn(r1, r2, rf ), B
n, Y n
))∣∣∣✁E]
+Pr {E} dmax
≤ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))] + ε
7
+
6ε
7
,
where the last inequality holds for some sufficiently large
n, and follows from Pr {E} ≤ 6γ, the definition of γ, and
standard argument in rate-distortion theory from the fact that
(An, vn(r1, r2, rf ), B
n, Y n) ∈ T nδ (A, V,B, Y ) when no error
occured (see e.g. [14, Appendix B-G]).
Condition D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))] is thus sufficient to
achieve distortion D + ε.
F. Equivocation Rate at Eve
The equivocation at Eve can be divided in “source” and
“channel” terms. Each one is studied using standard properties
of typical sequences, and following the arguments of [14,
Appendix B-H] and [7, Section 2.3.Step 3]:
H(An|EnZn)
= H(r1r2rfA
nXn|EnZn)−H(r1r2rfXn|AnEnZn)
(a)
= H(r1r2rfA
nXn|EnZn)−H(r2rf |r1AnZn)
(b)
≥ H(r1r2rfAnXn|EnZn)− n ε4
(c)
≥ H(r2rfAnXn|r1EnZn)− n ε4
= H(r2rfA
nXn|r1) +H(EnZn|r1r2rfAnXn)
−H(EnZn|r1)− n ε4
(d)
= H(rfA
n|r1) +H(EnZn|AnXn)−H(EnZn|r1)− n ε4
(e)
= H(An|r1) +H(rf ) +H(En|An) +H(Zn|Xn)
−H(EnZn|r1)− n ε4 , (25)
11
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that Xn (resp. r1) is a
deterministic function of (r1, r2, rf , An) (resp. An), and
the Markov chain (r2, rf )−
− (An, Zn)−
−En,
• step (b) from condition (24) (which ensures that
Eve can decode vn(r1, r2, rf ) from (un(r1),
An, Zn) with an arbitrarily small probability of error,
using a decoder similar to Bob’s one–see Sections VII-C,
VII-D), and Fano’s inequality (for some sufficiently
large n),
• step (c) from the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy,
• step (d) from the fact that (r2, Xn) is a determin-
istic function of (r1, rf , An), and the Markov chain
(En, Zn)−
− (An, Xn)−
− (r1, r2, rf ),
• step (e) from the fact that rf is independent of (r1, An),
and the Markov chains En −
−An −
− (Xn, Zn), Zn −
−
Xn −
− (An, En).
We now separately study each term of the r.h.s. of (25):
• From the fact that the codewords un(r1) are drawn i.i.d.,
and following the argument of [14, Lemma 6], we can
prove that
H(An|r1) ≥ n
(
H(A|U)− ε4
)
,
for some sufficiently large n.
• Since the random source rf is uniformly distributed with
rate Rf :
H(rf ) = nRf .
• Since the sources are i.i.d.:
H(En|An) = nH(E|A) .
• Since the channel is memoryless and the input Xn is
typical (see [7, Eq. (2.46)]),
H(Zn|Xn) ≥ n (H(Z|X)− ε4) .
• From the fact that (un(r1), En, Zn) are jointly typical,
and following the arguments of [7, Eq. (2.54)], we can
prove that
H(EnZn|r1) ≤ n
(
H(EZ|U) + ε4
)
.
Gathering all the above equations, we proved that
H(An|EnZn) ≥ n
(
H(A|U) +Rf +H(E|A)
+ H(Z|X)−H(EZ|U)− ε
)
, (26)
for some sufficiently large n.
After some algebraic manipulations using the Markov
chains U−
−A−
−E and (U,E)−
−X−
−Z , we proved that the
following condition is sufficient to achieve equivocation rate
∆− ε at Eve:
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)− I(X ;Z|UE) +Rf .
G. End of Proof
In this section, we proved that sufficient conditions for
the achievability of a tuple (k = 1, D,∆) are given by the
following system of inequalities:
R1 > I(U ;A)
R2 > I(V ;A|U)
Rf > 0
R1 < I(U ;BY )
R2 +Rf < I(V ;BY |U)
R2 +Rf < I(V ;AZ|U)
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))]
∆ ≤ H(A|UE)− I(X ;Z|UE) +Rf
Fourier-Motzkin elimination [27] then yields:
I(U ;A) < I(U ;BY )
I(V ;A|U) < I(V ;BY |U)
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))]
∆ < H(A|UE)− I(X ;Z|UE)
+ I(V ;BY |U)− I(V ;A|U)
∆ < H(A|UE)− I(X ;Z|UE)
+ I(V ;AZ|U)− I(V ;A|U)
This proves Theorem 3.
VIII. SECURE TRANSMISSION OF A BINARY SOURCE
WITH BEC/BSC SIDE INFORMATIONS OVER A TYPE-II
WIRETAP CHANNEL (CONTINUED)
In this section, we go back on the binary example introduced
in Section V and compare a hybrid coding scheme based on
Theorem 3 with the ones analyzed is Section V, namely the
digital scheme of Section III (see Proposition 4) and a pure
analog one consisting in directly sending the source over the
channel (see Proposition 5).
A. Hybrid Coding
We consider the hybrid scheme of Theorem 3 choosing
variables U , V and X as follows:
U = V ⊕W , (27)
V
⊥⊥A∼ B(12 ) , (28)
X = V ⊕A , (29)
where ⊕ stands for the binary exclusive-or operator, W is
independent of A and V , and W ∼ B(u) for some crossover
probability u ∈ [0, 12 ].
B. Numerical Results
Fig. 11 represents the largest equivocation rate at Eve ∆ as
a function of the erasure probability β for
1) the outer bound of Proposition 3,
2) the hybrid digital/analog scheme of Theorem 3 with
variables (27)–(29) (and optimizing over u),
3) the digital scheme of Proposition 4 (optimizing over u
and q),
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Figure 11: Equivocation rate ∆ as a function of erasure probability β (ǫ = 0.1, ζ = 0.1).
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Figure 12: Transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with side information.
4) the analog scheme of Proposition 5,
for parameter values ǫ = 0.1, ζ = 0.1.
If β ≤ 4ǫ(1 − ǫ), B is less noisy than E (see Fig. 7), and
the digital scheme is optimal (as stated by Proposition 1), as
well as the proposed hybrid one. Here, this result also holds
when B is only more capable than E i.e., for β ≤ h2(ǫ). On
the other hand, for β = 1, as already noted in Section V-C,
the naive pure analog scheme outperforms the digital one.
However, depending on the parameters ǫ, ζ, this is not the
case for all values β in [h2(ǫ), 1) as it is shown in Fig. 11. In
particular, for β ∈ (h2(ǫ), 1) the side information at Bob and
Eve cannot be ordered (see Fig. 7), and hence it appears that
the hybrid digital/analog scheme performs strictly better than
both: pure analogue and the digital schemes. Furthermore, this
region cannot be achieved via time sharing between the digital
and analogue schemes. This can be explained by noting that in
this regime successive refinement coding, via the two layers
used in the digital scheme, does not improve on the hybrid
digital/analog scheme with a single digital layer.
IX. SECURE TRANSMISSION OF A GAUSSIAN SOURCE
OVER A GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. System Model
In this section, we consider the transmission of a Gaussian
source over a Gaussian wiretap channel with matched band-
width. More precisely, as depicted in Fig. 12, the source at
Alice A is standard Gaussian, and observations at Bob and
Eve are the outputs of independent additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels with input A and respective noise
powers PB and PE . Communication channels from Alice to
Bob and Charlie are AWGN channels with respective noise
powers PY and PZ . The average input power of this channel
is limited to P . One channel use is allowed per source symbol.
Euclidean distance on R is used to measure distortion at
Bob (d(a, b) = (a − b)2, for each a, b ∈ R). Differential
entropy h(·) measures uncertainty yielding equivocation rates
∆ ∈ R. We also introduce quantity DE = 22∆/(2πe), which
provides a lower bound on the minimum mean-square error
of any estimator of A at Eve [31, Theorem 8.6.6]. It is worth
mentioning that the information leakage reads:
1
n
I(An;EnZn) = H(A)− 1
n
H(An|EnZn)
≤ H(A)−∆
= H(A)− 1
2
log2(2πe)DE .
Definition 3 (Achievability): In this section, a tuple
(D,DE) ∈ R∗+2 is said to be achievable if, for any ε > 0,
13
there exists an (n, n)-code (F, g) such that:
E
[ ‖An − g(Bn, Y n)‖2 ] ≤ D + ε ,
1
n
h(An|EnZn) ≥ 1
2
log (2πeDE)− ε ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
X2i
] ≤ P + ε ,
with channel input Xn as the output of the encoder F (An).
B. First Results
Although Theorems 1, 2, 3 are stated and proved for
finite alphabets, we take the liberty to use their statements
as inner/outer regions also for this quadratic Gaussian case.
The involved probability distributions should now also verify
condition
Var [X ] ≤ P . (30)
The corresponding regions will be denoted with an additional
·P i.e., RPout, RPdigital and RPhybrid.
Notice that due to the Gaussian additive noises, and depend-
ing on the relative values of PB , PE (resp. PY , PZ ), one side
information (resp. one channel) is a stochastically degraded
version of the other. There exist four different cases and, from
the results of Section III-C, separation holds for three of them,
as summarized in Table I. In these cases, we can moreover
prove closed-from expressions for the achievable region, as
stated by Propositions 6 and 7 below.
Proposition 6: Assume that PB ≤ PE . A tuple (D,DE) is
achievable if and only if
D ≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤
1 + 1
PB
1 + 1
PE
·D ·max
{
1 ;
1 + P
PY
1 + P
PZ
}
.
Proof: The proof of the converse part is given in Ap-
pendix F.
The direct part follows from Proposition 1 by choosing
appropriate Gaussian auxiliary random variables: U constant,
X = T = Q to a Gaussian random variable of variance P and
V is the usual random variable for the Gaussian Wyner-Ziv
problem. Details are omitted.
Proposition 7: Assume that PB > PE and PY ≥ PZ . A
tuple (D,DE) is achievable if and only if
D ≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤ 11
D
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
Proof: The proof of the converse part is given in Ap-
pendix G.
PB ≤ PE PB > PE
PY < PZ X ?
PY ≥ PZ X X
Table I: Cases where Rdigital is tight and separation holds.
The direct part follows from Proposition 2 by choosing
appropriate Gaussian auxiliary random variables. Details are
omitted.
As a matter of fact, the case when Bob has “better” channel
(PY < PZ ) and “worse” side information (PB > PE ) than
Eve is still open. In this quadratic Gaussian example, the outer
bound RPout reduces to the one given by Proposition 8 below.
Proposition 8: Assume that PB > PE and PY < PZ . Any
achievable tuple (D,DE) verifies the following inequalities:
D ≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤ 1
1
D
· 1+
P
PZ
1+ P
PY
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
Proof: See Appendix H.
We next propose a hybrid digital/analog scheme based on
Theorem 3 that turns out to be optimal i.e., that achieves the
region of Proposition 8, when PY < PZ and PB →∞.
C. Hybrid Coding
Proposition 9 below follows from Theorem 3 choosing
variables U , V and X as follows:
U = ∅ , (31)
V = αA+ γN , (32)
X =
(
βA− γN)√P , (33)
where α ∈ R, β ∈ [0, 1), γ =
√
1− β2 and N ∼ N (0, 1) is
a standard Gaussian random variable independent of A. Note
that X ∼ N (0, P ) can be written as a deterministic function
of A and V :
X =
(
(α+ β)A − V )√P . (34)
Function Aˆ is defined as the MMSE estimator of A from
(V,B, Y ).
The hybrid digital/analog scheme of Section VI with vari-
ables (31)–(33) reduces to the one depicted in Fig. 13.
Proposition 9 (Hybrid scheme): A tuple (D,DE) ∈ R∗+2
is achievable if
D ≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
+ α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
, (35)
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
+ P
PZ
(
1 + γ
2
PE
) (36)
· min
 1 +
1
PB
+ P
PY
(
1 + γ
2
PB
)
1 + 1
PB
+ α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
; 1 + γ2
P
PZ
 , (37)
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Figure 13: Hybrid digital/analog scheme for secure transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel.
for some α ∈ R, β ∈ [0, 1) such that
α2
γ2
+
P
PY
(α+ β)2 ≤ P
PY
(
1 +
γ2
PB
)
, (38)
where
γ =
√
1− β2 . (39)
Proof: See Appendix I.
Remark 3: In the proposed scheme, unlike dirty-paper cod-
ing for point-to-point communication without secrecy con-
straint [32], the source A (that can be viewed as the state
of some channel, known at the encoder –see Fig. 9) and the
channel input X are not independent.
D. Special Case: PY < PZ , PB →∞
From now on, we focus on the unsolved case (represented
by “?” in Table I). In particular, we assume that PY < PZ .
Then, if Bob does not have any side information i.e., B = ∅
or equivalently PB →∞:
• The hybrid digital/analog scheme of Proposition 9 is
optimal and yields Theorem 4.
• The digital scheme of Theorem 2 is strictly sub-optimal,
as shown by Proposition 10 and Fig. 14.
Theorem 4 (Closed-form characterization): If PY < PZ
and B = ∅, (D,DE) ∈ R∗+2 is achievable if and only if
D ≥ 1
1 + P
PY
, (40)
DE ≤ 1
max
{
1 ; 1
D
· 1+
P
PZ
1+ P
PY
}
+ 1
PE
. (41)
Proof: The converse part directly follows from Proposi-
tion 8 by letting PB tend to infinity.
The direct part follows after Proposition 9 by letting PB
tend to infinity and choosing, for any distortion level:
D ∈
[
1
1 + P
PY
,
1 + P
PZ
1 + P
PY
)
,
α =
β + γ2
√
1
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
1 + γ2 P
PY
− β , (42)
β =
√
PZ
P
√
1 +
P
PZ
−D
(
1 +
P
PY
)
. (43)
Details are provided in Appendix J.
The following proposition provides a simple expression of
region RPdigital i.e., the set of all tuples achievable by the digital
scheme of Section III.
Proposition 10 (Digital scheme): If PY < PZ and B = ∅,
(D,DE) ∈ RPdigital if and only if
D ≥ 1
1 + P
PY
, (44)
DE ≤ 11
µ
+ 1
PE
·min
1 ; D
(
1 + P
PY
)
1 + µ P
PZ
− (1 − µ)PY
PZ
 ,(45)
for some µ ∈
[
1
1+ P
PY
, 1
]
.
Proof: The proof of the converse part is given in Ap-
pendix K.
The direct part follows from Theorem 2 with Gaussian
variables U , V , Q and T = X after some straightforward
derivations. Details are omitted.
Remark 4: If D ≥ 1+
P
PZ
1+ P
PY
, then µ = 1 is optimal in
Proposition 10, yielding inequalities (40), (41) in Theorem 4.
This implies that the digital scheme of Section III is opti-
mal in this region. For such distortion levels, the quantity
DE =
1
1+ 1
PE
= Var [A|E] is achievable, meaning that Eve
cannot retrieve additional information from the communication
between Alice and Bob.
In the following, we will also compare the two above
schemes with a pure analog one, consisting in directly sending
a scaled version of the source over the channel. Its perfor-
mance is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Analog scheme): If B = ∅, (D,DE) ∈
R
∗
+
2 is achievable through an analog scheme if
D ≥ 1
1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
+
[(
1
D
− 1) PY
PZ
]
+
.
Proof: See Appendix L.
Remark 5: If D = Dmin , 11+ P
PY
, then Proposition 11
yields inequalities (40), (41) in Theorem 4 i.e., the above
analog scheme is optimal.
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Figure 14: Quantity DE as a function of the distortion at Bob D (P = 1, PY = 0.5, PZ = 1, PE = 1).
Remark 6: When there is no secrecy requirement i.e.,
DE = 0, all the above schemes can achieve distortion Dmin,
as stated in [19], [33].
Numerical Results: Fig. 14 represents the largest achievable
DE as a function of the distortion level at Bob D for
1) the optimal hybrid digital/analog scheme of Theorem 4,
2) the digital scheme of Proposition 10 (optimizing over
µ),
3) the analog scheme of Proposition 11,
for parameter values P = 1, PY = 0.5, PZ = 1, PE = 1.
As a matter of fact, the proposed hybrid digital/analog
scheme outperforms both pure analog and digital schemes.
Furthermore, while the digital scheme is optimal for D ≥
1+ P
PZ
1+ P
PY
(Remark 4) and the analog one for D = Dmin
(Remark 5), a time-sharing combination of these falls short to
achieve the entire region, as shown by Fig. 14 and Theorem 4.
Remark 7: While the hybrid digital/analog scheme of Sec-
tion IX-C can be used regardless of the values of the param-
eters, we did not manage to prove a result of optimality in
the more general case where PB < ∞. However, numerical
optimization over α and β in Proposition 9 tends to show that
this scheme does not achieve the outer bound of Proposition 8.
X. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have investigated the general problem of
source-channel coding for secure transmission of sources over
noisy channels with side information at the receivers. This
setting can be seen as a generalization of the problems of
secure source coding with side information at the decoders,
and the wiretap channel. A general outer bound on the
corresponding achievable region has been derived, as well as
two inner bounds based on (i) a pure digital scheme which
combines secure source coding of [13], [14] with coding for
broadcast channels with confidential messages [3], and (ii) a
novel hybrid digital/analog scheme (in the matched-bandwidth
case).
The proposed bounds do not match in general, but the
digital scheme turns out to be optimal under some less noisy
conditions. However, a simple counterexample shows that a
joint source-channel scheme may achieve better performance
in some other cases. At first look, this is not surprising since
it is well-known that joint source-channel coding/decoding
are well-suited for broadcast channels without secrecy con-
straints [20], when all decoders must perfectly reconstruct the
source. But the secure setting is rather different because Alice
only wants to help one receiver (Bob), while she wants to blur
the other one (Eve). Therefore, the intuition indicates that the
optimal strategy would be the opposite i.e., separation between
source and channel encoders, as in Propositions 1 and 2. On
the other hand, the proposed hybrid digital/analog scheme can
be useful in terms of secrecy. In a quadratic Gaussian setup
when side information is only present at the eavesdropper, this
strategy turns out to be optimal. However, in a more general
case where both receivers have side information, a new scheme
seems to be needed.
APPENDIX A
STRONGLY TYPICAL SEQUENCES AND
DELTA-CONVENTION
Following [34], we use in this paper strongly typical sets and
the so-called Delta-Convention. Some useful facts are recalled
here. Let X and Y be random variables on some finite sets X
and Y , respectively. We denote by pX,Y (resp. pY |X , and pX )
the joint probability distribution of (X,Y ) (resp. conditional
distribution of Y given X , and marginal distribution of X).
Definition 4 (Number of occurrences): For any sequence
xn ∈ Xn and any symbol a ∈ X , notation N(a|xn) stands
for the number of occurrences of a in xn.
Definition 5 (Typical sequence): A sequence xn ∈ Xn is
called (strongly) δ-typical w.r.t. X (or simply typical if the
context is clear) if∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a|xn)− pX(a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ for each a ∈ X ,
and N(a|xn) = 0 for each a ∈ X such that pX(a) = 0. The
set of all such sequences is denoted by T nδ (X).
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Definition 6 (Conditionally typical sequence): Let xn ∈
Xn. A sequence yn ∈ Yn is called (strongly) δ-typical (w.r.t.
Y ) given xn if, for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, b|xn, yn)− 1nN(a|xn)pY |X(b|a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ ,
and, N(a, b|xn, yn) = 0 for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y such that
pY |X(b|a) = 0. The set of all such sequences is denoted by
T nδ (Y |xn).
Delta-Convention [34] 1: For any sets X , Y , there exists a
sequence {δn}n∈N∗ such that the lemmas stated below hold.2
From now on, typical sequences are understood with δ = δn.
Typical sets are still denoted by T nδ (·).
Lemma 2 ( [34, Lemma 1.2.12]): There exists a sequence
ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that
pX(T
n
δ (X)) ≥ 1− ηn .
Lemma 3 ( [34, Lemma 1.2.13]): There exists a sequence
ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that, for each xn ∈ T nδ (X),∣∣∣∣ 1n log ‖T nδ (X)‖ −H(X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn ,∣∣∣∣ 1n log ‖T nδ (Y |xn)‖ −H(Y |X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn .
Lemma 4 (Asymptotic equipartition property): There
exists a sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that, for each xn ∈ T nδ (X)
and each yn ∈ T nδ (Y |xn),∣∣∣∣− 1n log pX(xn)−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn ,∣∣∣∣− 1n log pY |X(yn|xn)−H(Y |X)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn .
Lemma 5 (Joint typicality lemma [35]): There exists a se-
quence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that∣∣∣∣− 1n log pY (T nδ (Y |xn))− I(X ;Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn for each xn ∈ T nδ (X) .
Proof:
pY (T
n
δ (Y |xn)) =
∑
yn∈Tn
δ
(Y |xn)
pY (y
n)
(a)
≤ ‖T nδ (Y |xn)‖ 2−n[H(Y )−αn]
(b)
≤ 2n[H(Y |X)+βn] 2−n[H(Y )−αn]
= 2−n[I(X;Y )−βn−αn] ,
where
• step (a) follows from the fact that T nδ (Y |xn) ⊂ T nδ (Y )
and Lemma 4, for some sequence αn −−−−→
n→∞
0,
• step (b) from Lemma 3, for some sequence βn −−−−→
n→∞
0.
The reverse inequality pY (T nδ (Y |xn)) ≥ 2−n[I(X;Y )+βn+αn]
can be proved following similar argument.
2As a matter of fact, δn → 0 and
√
n δn →∞ as n→∞.
APPENDIX B
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTIONS
Following [36, Section II], we use in this paper a technique
based on undirected graphs, that provides a sufficient condi-
tion for establishing Markov chains from a joint distribution.
Such a technique for establishing conditional independence
was introduced in [37] for Bayesian networks, and further
generalized to various types of graphs [38]. This paragraph
recalls the main points of this technique.
Assume that a sequence of random variables Xn has joint
distribution with the following form:
p(xn) = f1(xS1)f2(xS2) · · · fk(xSk) ,
where, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Si is a subset of {1, . . . , n},
notation xSi stands for collection (xj)j∈Si , and fi is some
nonnegative function.
A. Drawing the Graph
Draw an undirected graph where all involved random vari-
ables e.g., (Xj)j∈{1,...,n}, are nodes. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
draw edges between all the nodes in XSi .
B. Checking Markov Relations
Let G1, G2, and G3 be three disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n}.
If all paths in the graph from a node in XG1 to a node in XG3
pass through a node in XG2 , then XG1 −
−XG2 −
−XG3 form
a Markov chain. The proof of this result can be found in [36]
and is omitted here.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 (OUTER BOUND)
Let (k,D,∆) be an achievable tuple, and ε > 0. There
exists an (n,m)-code (F, g) s.t.
m
n
≤ k + ε , (46)
E [d(An, g(Bn, Y m))] ≤ D + ε , (47)
1
n
H(An|EnZm) ≥ ∆− ε , (48)
with channel input Xm as the output of the encoder F (An).
From the fact that random variables Ai, Bi, Ei are inde-
pendent across time and the channel X 7→ (Y, Z) is mem-
oryless, the joint distribution of (An, Bn, En, Xm, Y m, Zm)
can be written as follows, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and each
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
p(an, bn, en, xm, ym, zm) = p(ai−1, bi−1, ei−1)
× p(ai, bi, ei) p(ani+1, bni+1, eni+1)PF (xm|an)
× p(yj−1, zj−1|xj−1) p(yj, zj |xj) p(ymj+1, zmj+1|xmj+1) .
Following the technique described in Appendix B and using
the above expression, we can obtain the graph of Fig. 15 that
will be used to establish Markov chains.
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Figure 15: Outer bound–Graphical representation of distribution p(anbnenxmymzm).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (resp. each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}), define
the source (resp. channel) auxiliary random variables Ui, Vi
(resp. Qj , Tj) as
Ui = ( B
n
i+1, E
i−1, Zm) , (49)
Vi = (A
i−1, Bi−1, Bni+1, E
i−1, Y m) , (50)
Qj = ( B
n, Y j−1, Zmj+1) , (51)
Tj = (A
n, Bn, Y j−1, Zmj+1) . (52)
Note that (Ui, Vi)−
−Ai−
− (Bi, Ei), and Qj −
−Tj −
−Xj −

− (Yj , Zj) form Markov chains (see Fig. 15).
Following the usual technique, we introduce independent
random variables K and J , uniformly distributed over the
sets {1, . . . , n} and {1, . . . ,m}, respectively. We also define
random variables A = AK , B = BK , E = EK , U =
(K,UK), V = (K,VK), X = XJ , Y = YJ , Z = ZJ ,
Q = (J,Qj), and T = (J, Tj). (U, V ) −
−A −
− (B,E) and
Q−
−T−
−X−
−(Y, Z) still form Markov chains. (A,B,E), resp.
(X,Y, Z), is distributed according to p(abe), resp. p(xyz), i.e.,
the original distribution of (Ai, Bi, Ei), resp. (Xj , Yj , Zj).
A. Rate
We first prove the rate inequality (4) in Theorem 1:
I(An;Y m|Bn) (a)=
n∑
i=1
I(Ai;Y
m|Ai−1Bn)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ai;Y
m|Ai−1BnEi−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;A
i−1Bi−1Bni+1E
i−1Y m|Bi)
− I(Ai;Ai−1Bi−1Bni+1Ei−1|Bi)
]
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ai;A
i−1Bi−1Bni+1E
i−1Y m|Bi)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ai;Vi|Bi) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional
mutual information,
• step (b) from the Markov chain (Ai, Y m)−
−(Ai−1, Bn)−

− Ei−1 (see Fig. 15),
• step (c) from the independence of random variables Ai,
Bi, and Ei across time,
• step (d) from definition (50).
We now find an upper bound for the latter quantity:
I(An;Y m|Bn) (a)=
m∑
j=1
I(An;Yj |BnY j−1)
(b)
≤
m∑
j=1
I(AnBnY j−1Zmj+1;Yj)
(c)
≤
m∑
j=1
I(Tj ;Yj) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional
mutual information,
• step (b) from the non-negativity of mutual information,
• step (c) from definition (52).
Putting all pieces together, we proved that
n∑
i=1
I(Ai;Vi|Bi) ≤
m∑
j=1
I(Tj ;Yj) . Using random variables
K and J , this inequality can be written as
n∑
i=1
I(AK ;VK |BK ,K = i) ≤
m∑
j=1
I(TJ ;YJ |J = j) ,
i.e.,
I(A;V |B) ≤ m
n
I(T ;Y ) . (53)
B. Distortion at Bob
Bob reconstructs g(Bn, Y m). The i-th coordinate of this
estimate is
gi(Y
m, Bi−1, Bi, B
n
i+1) , Aˆi(Vi, Bi) .
The component-wise mean distortion at Bob thus can be
written as:
E
[
d(An,g(Bn, Y m))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(Ai, Aˆi(Vi, Bi))
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
d(AK , AˆK(VK , BK))
∣∣∣ K = i]
= E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B))
]
, (54)
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where we defined function Aˆ on V × B by Aˆ(V,B) =
Aˆ(K,VK , BK) , AˆK(VK , BK).
C. Equivocation Rate at Eve
We expand the equivocation at Eve H(An|EnZm) in two
ways.
1) : First,
H(An|EnZm) (a)=
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|Ani+1EnZm)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|Ani+1Bni+1EiZm)
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|Bni+1EiZm)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Ai|UiEi) ,
where
• step (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional
entropy,
• step (b) from the Markov chain Ai−
− (Ani+1, Ei, Zm)−

− (Bni+1, Eni+1) (see Fig. 15),
• step (c) from the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy,
• step (d) from definition (49).
Using random variable K defined above, the equivocation rate
at Eve can be bounded as follows:
1
n
H(An|EnZm) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(AK |UKEK ,K = i)
= H(A|UE) . (55)
2) : Second, from standard properties of conditional en-
tropy and mutual information:
H(An|EnZm) =
H(An|BnY m) + I(An;BnY m)− I(An;EnZm)
= H(An|BnY m) + I(An;Y m|Bn) + I(An;Bn)
−I(An;En|Zm)− I(An;Zm)
(a)
= H(An|BnY m) + I(An;Y m|Bn) + I(AnZm;Bn)
−I(An;En|Zm)− I(BnAn;Zm)
= H(An|BnY m) + I(An;Bn|Zm)− I(An;En|Zm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆s
+ I(An;Y m|Bn)− I(An;Zm|Bn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆c
,(56)
where step (a) follows from the Markov chain Bn−
−An−
−Zm.
We now separately study the “source” term ∆s and the
“channel” term ∆c.
a) Study of ∆s: The "source” term ∆s can be studied
following the argument for the converse part of [14, Theo-
rem 3] (see [14, Appendix E-C]):
∆s = H(A
n|BnY m) + I(An;Bn|Zm)− I(An;En|Zm)
(a)
= H(An|BnY m) + I(An;Bn)− I(Zm;Bn)
− I(An;En) + I(Zm;En)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ai−1BnY m) + I(Ai;Bi)
− I(Zm;Bi|Bni+1)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(Zm;Ei|Ei−1)
]
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ai−1BnY m) + I(Ai;Bi)
− I(Bni+1Zm;Bi)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(Ei−1Zm;Ei)
]
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ai−1BnEi−1Y m) + I(Ai;Bi)
− I(Bni+1Zm;Bi)− I(Ai;Ei) + I(Ei−1Zm;Ei)
+ I(Ei;B
n
i+1|Ei−1Zm)− I(Bi;Ei−1|Bni+1Zm)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|Ai−1BnEi−1Y m) + I(Ai;Bi)− I(Ai;Ei)
+ I(Ei;B
n
i+1E
i−1Zm)− I(Bi;Bni+1Ei−1Zm)
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|ViBi) + I(Ai;Bi)− I(Ai;Ei)
+ I(Ei;Ui)− I(Bi;Ui)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|ViBi) +H(Ai|Ei)−H(Ai|Bi)
+ H(Ui|Bi)−H(Ui|Ei)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|UiEi)− I(Ai;Vi|Bi) + I(Ui;Ai|Bi)
−
(
I(Ai;Ui|Ei) +H(Ui|Ai)−H(Ui|Ei)
)]
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Ai|UiEi)
−
(
I(Ai;Vi|Bi)− I(Ai;Ui|Bi)
)]
, (57)
where
• step (a) follows from the Markov chain (Bn, En) −
−
An −
− Zm,
• step (b) from the chain rules for conditional entropy and
mutual information, and the fact that random variables
Ai, Bi and Ei are independent across time,
• step (c) from the Markov chain Ai−
−(Ai−1, Bn, Y m)−
−
Ei−1 (see Fig. 15) and Csiszár and Körner’s equality [3,
Lemma 7],
n∑
i=1
I(Ei;B
n
i+1|Ei−1Zm) =
n∑
i=1
I(Bi;E
i−1|Bni+1Zm) ,
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• step (d) from definitions (49) and (50),
• step (e) from the Markov chain Ui −
−Ai −
− (Bi, Ei).
b) Study of ∆c: The “channel” term ∆c can be studied
following the argument for the converse part of [3, Theorem 1]
(see [3, Section V], [7, Section 2.4]):
∆c = I(A
n;Y m|Bn)− I(An;Zm|Bn)
(a)
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(An;Yj |BnY j−1)− I(An;Zj |BnZmj+1)
]
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(AnZmj+1;Yj |BnY j−1)
−I(Zmj+1;Yj |AnBnY j−1)− I(AnY j−1;Zj |BnZmj+1)
+I(Y j−1;Zj |AnBnZmj+1)
]
(b)
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(AnZmj+1;Yj |BnY j−1)− I(AnY j−1;Zj|BnZmj+1)
]
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(An;Yj |BnY j−1Zmj+1) + I(Zmj+1;Yj |BnY j−1)
−I(An;Zj |BnY j−1Zmj+1)− I(Y j−1;Zj |BnZmj+1)
]
(c)
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(An;Yj |BnY j−1Zmj+1)− I(An;Zj|BnY j−1Zmj+1)
]
(d)
=
m∑
j=1
[
I(Tj ;Yj |Qj)− I(Tj ;Zj|Qj)
]
, (58)
where
• step (a) follows from the chain rule for conditional
mutual information,
• steps (b) and (c) from Csiszár and Körner’s equality [3,
Lemma 7],
• step (d) from definitions (51) and (52).
c) : Gathering (56)–(58), using variables J , K , and new
source-channel variables, the equivocation rate at Eve can be
written as:
1
n
H(An|EnZm) = H(A|UE)−
[
I(A;V |B)− I(A;U |B)
− m
n
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
. (59)
D. End of Proof
Inequalities (53)–(55), and (59) only involve marginal dis-
tributions of auxiliary variables p(uv|a) and p(qtx). Con-
sequently, we can define new variables U˜ , V˜ , Q˜, T˜ , X˜ ,
with identical marginal distributions p(uv|a) and p(qtx)
(and hence verifying (53)–(55), and (59)) such that the
(global) joint distribution can be written as p(uvqtabexyz) =
p(uv|a)p(abe) p(q|t)p(t)p(x|t)p(yz|x) i.e., such that source
and channel variables are independent.
Gathering inequalities (53)–(55), (59), and (46)–(48),
we then proved that, for each achievable tuple (k,D,∆)
and each ε > 0, there exist random variables U ,
V , Q, T , X with joint distribution p(uvqtabexyz) =
p(uv|a)p(abe)p(q|t)p(t)p(x|t)p(yz|x), and a function Aˆ such
that
I(A;V |B) ≤ (k + ε)I(T ;Y ) ,
D + ε ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆− ε ≤ H(A|UE)−
[
I(V ;A|B)− I(U ;A|B) ,
− (k + ε)
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
,
i.e., (k+ ε,D+ ε,∆− ε) ∈ Rout. Letting ε tend to zero then
proves Theorem 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 4
Let (k = 1, D = 0,∆) ∈ Rdigital i.e., such that there
exist random variables U , V , Q, T , X with joint distribution
p(uvqtaexyz) = p(u|v)p(v|a)p(ae)p(q|t)p(tx)p(yz|x), and a
function Aˆ, verifying
I(U ;A|B)≤I(Q;Y ) ,
I(V ;A|B)≤I(T ;Y ) ,
0≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆≤H(A|UE)−
[
I(V ;A|UB)−
(
I(T ;Y |Q)
− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
.
From the assumptions of Section V, we can easily prove
the following inequalities:
β(1 −H(A|U))≤1−H(X |Q) , (60)
∆≤H(A|U) + h2(ǫ)−H(E|U)−
[
βH(A|U)
−
(
H(X |Q)−H(Z|Q) + h2(ζ)
)]
+
. (61)
Since 0 ≤ H(A|U) ≤ H(A) = 1 and 0 ≤ H(X |Q) ≤
H(X) ≤ 1, we now introduce two parameters: u =
h−12
(
H(A|U)), q = h−12 (H(X |Q)).
Then, from the fact that E is the output of a BSC with
crossover probability ǫ and input A, Mrs. Gerber’s lemma [39]
yields:
H(E|U) ≥ h2(ǫ ⋆ u) . (62)
Similarly, since Z is the output of a BSC with crossover
probability ζ and input X :
H(Z|Q) ≥ h2(ζ ⋆ q) . (63)
Gathering (60)–(63), we obtain
β(1 − h2(u))≤1− h2(q) ,
∆≤h2(u) + h2(ǫ)− h2(ǫ ⋆ u)
−
[
βh2(u)−
(
h2(q)− h2(ζ ⋆ q) + h2(ζ)
)]
+
.
This proves the converse part of Proposition 4.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this section, we prove Lemma 1 following the argument
of [24]. In the decoding procedure described in Section VII-C,
an error occurs in the first step if there exists another admis-
sible codeword un(r′1) with r′1 6= r1. The probability of this
event can be written as
Pd,1 , Pr {∃ r′1 6= r1 : (un(r′1), Bn, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )}
≤
2nR1∑
r′1=1
Pr {r1 6= r′1, (un(r′1), Bn, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )}
=
2nR1∑
r′1=1
∑
an
p(an) Pr
{
r1 6= r′1, (un(r′1), Bn, Y n)
∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )
∣∣∣ An = an} .(64)
We now study each term of the above summation: For each
r′1, and each an,
Pr
{
r1 6= r′1, (un(r′1), Bn, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )
∣∣∣ An = an}
≤ Pr
{
(un(r′1), B
n, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )
∣∣∣An = an, r1 6= r′1}
=
∑
(un,bn,yn)∈Tn
δ
(U,B,Y )
Pr
{
un(r′1) = u
n, Bn = bn, Y n = yn
∣∣∣An = an, r1 6= r′1}
=
∑
(un,bn,yn)∈Tn
δ
(U,B,Y )
Pr
{
un(r′1) = u
n
∣∣∣ An = an, r1 6= r′1}
×Pr
{
Bn = bn, Y n = yn
∣∣∣ An = an, r1 6= r′1} . (65)
For each r′1, and each an, according to the encoding
procedure described in Section VII-B,
Pr
{
r1 = r
′
1
∣∣∣ An = an} =
Pr
{r′1−1⋂
k=1
{
un(k) /∈ T nδ (U |an)
} ∩ {un(r′1) ∈ T nδ (U |an)}}
≤ Pr {un(r′1) ∈ T nδ (U |an)}
≤ 2−n(I(U ;A)−ηn) ,
where the last inequality holds for some sequence ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0
(see Lemma 5 in Appendix A) from the fact that the codewords
are uniformly distributed over T nδ (U), independent of the
source, and an ∈ T nδ (A). From this inequality, there exists
κ < 1 such that, for some sufficiently large n,
Pr
{
r1 = r
′
1
∣∣∣ An = an} ≤ κ . (66)
The above upper bound yields the following inequality, for
each un, r′1, and an:
Pr
{
un(r′1) = u
n
∣∣∣ An = an, r1 6= r′1}
= Pr
{
un(r′1) = u
n
∣∣∣ An = an}
×
Pr
{
r1 6= r′1
∣∣∣ An = an, un(r′1) = un}
1− Pr
{
r1 = r′1
∣∣∣ An = an}
≤ Pr {u
n(r′1) = u
n}
1− κ , (67)
where the above equation follows from (66) and the fact that
un(r′1) and An are independent.
Plugging (67) into (65) yields, for each r′1, and each an,
Pr
{
r1 6= r′1, (un(r′1), Bn, Y n) ∈ T nδ (U,B, Y )
∣∣∣ An = an}
≤
∑
(un,bn,yn)∈Tn
δ
(U,B,Y )
Pr {un(r′1) = un}
1− κ
× Pr
{
Bn = bn, Y n = yn
∣∣∣ An = an, r1 6= r′1} . (68)
From (66) once again, the last term in the r.h.s. of the above
equation can be upper bounded as follows, for each r′1, each
an, and each (bn, yn) ∈ T nδ (B, Y ):
Pr
{
Bn = bn, Y n = yn
∣∣∣ An = an, r1 6= r′1}
=
Pr
{
Bn = bn, Y n = yn, r1 6= r′1
∣∣∣ An = an}
Pr
{
r1 6= r′1
∣∣∣ An = an}
≤
Pr
{
Bn = bn, Y n = yn
∣∣∣ An = an}
1− κ . (69)
Gathering (64), (68) and (69), we obtain, from the fact that
the codewords are identically distributed,
Pd,1 ≤ 2
nR1
(1 − κ)2
∑
(un,bn,yn)∈Tn
δ
(U,B,Y )
Pr {un(1) = un}
× Pr {Bn = bn, Y n = yn} .
Finally, from the joint typicality lemma (Lemma 5 in Ap-
pendix A), there exists a sequence η′n −−−−→
n→∞
0 such that
Pd,1 ≤ 2
nR1
(1 − κ)2 2
−n(I(U ;BY )−η′n) .
This proves Lemma 1.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 6
Assume that PB ≤ PE , and let (D,DE) be
an achievable tuple. From Proposition 1, there
exist random variables V , Q, T , X with joint
distribution p(vqtabexyz) = p(v|a)p(abe) p(q|t)p(t)
p(x|t)p(yz|x), and a function Aˆ, verifying
I(V ;A|B) ≤ I(T ;Y ) ,
D ≥ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆ ≤ h(A|E)−
[
I(V ;A|B)− I(T ;Y |Q) + I(T ;Z|Q)
]
+
,
Var [X ] ≤ P ,
21
where ∆ = 12 log(2πeDE).
Then, from standard properties of differential entropy, and
from the fact that distortion measure d is the Euclidean
distance on R, the following sequence of inequalities holds
true:
22h(A|V B)/(2πe) ≤ Var [A|V B] ≤ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
Ä and hence
22I(V ;A|B) =
22h(A|B)
22h(A|V B)
≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
.
Gathering the above equations, tuple (D,DE) verifies the
following inequalities:
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤
1 + 1
PB
1 + 1
PE
·D · 22[I(T ;Y |Q)−I(T ;Z|Q)] .
Depending on the values of PY and PZ , there are two
different cases, investigated in the following paragraphs.
A. PY < PZ
Assume in this section that PY < PZ . According to
Remark 2, the Markov chain X −
− Y −
− Z can be assumed
without loss of generality. Hence, from the long Markov chain
Q −
− T −
− X −
− Y −
− Z , I(T ;Y |Q) − I(T ;Z|Q) =
I(T, Y |QZ) ≤ I(X ;Y |Z), and tuple (D,DE) verifies the
following inequalities:
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤
1 + 1
PB
1 + 1
PE
·D · 22I(X;Y |Z) .
Then, from the Markov chain X −
− Y −
− Z , there exists
a random variable N˜Z ∼ N (0, PZ − PY ), independent of
Y , such that Z = Y + N˜Z . The entropy power inequality
(EPI) [15], [35] yields:
22h(Z) ≥ 22h(Y ) + 22h(N˜Z) .
From the latter equation and inequality Var [Y ] ≤ P + PY ,
I(X ;Y |Z) = h(Y )− h(Y |X)− h(Z) + h(Z|X)
≤ h(Y )− h(NY )
− 1
2
log
(
22h(Y ) + 22h(N˜Z)
)
+ h(NZ)
≤ 1
2
log
(
1
1 + PZ−PY
P+PY
PZ
PY
)
=
1
2
log
(
1 + P
PY
1 + P
PZ
)
. (70)
Tuple (D,DE) thus verifies the following inequalities:
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤
1 + 1
PB
1 + 1
PE
·D · 1 +
P
PY
1 + P
PZ
.
B. PY ≥ PZ
Assume in this section that PY ≥ PZ . Then, I(T ;Y |Q) ≤
I(T ;Z|Q), and tuple (D,DE) verifies the following inequal-
ities:
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
,
DE ≤
1 + 1
PB
1 + 1
PE
·D .
This concludes the proof of the converse part of Proposi-
tion 6.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 7
Assume that PB > PE and PY ≥ PZ , and let (D,DE) be
an achievable tuple. From Proposition 2, there exist random
variables U , V , X with joint distribution p(uvabexyz) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(ae)p(b|e) p(x)p(yz|x),3 and a function Aˆ, ver-
ifying
I(V ;A|B)≤I(X ;Y ) ,
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆≤h(A|V B) + I(A;B|U)− I(A;E|U) ,
Var [X ]≤P ,
where ∆ = 12 log(2πeDE).
From the long Markov chain U −
− V −
−A−
− E −
−B,
I(A;B|U) − I(A;E|U) = −I(A;E|UB) ≤ −I(A;E|V B),
and tuple (D,∆) verifies the following inequalities:
I(V ;A|B)≤I(X ;Y ) , (71)
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] , (72)
∆≤h(A|V B)− h(E|V B) + h(E|AB) , (73)
Var [X ]≤P . (74)
Moreover, the side informations write:
E = A+NE ,
B = A+NE + N¯B = E + N¯B ,
where N¯B ∼ N (0, PB −PE) is independent of A and NE ∼
N (0, PE).
3Since it is assumed that PB > PE , according to Remark 2, the Markov
chain A−
−E −
−B can be assumed here without loss of generality.
22
In order to find an upper bound on the r.h.s. of (73), we
need the following expansion of E, for any γ ∈ R:
E = γB + (1 − γ)A+ C , (75)
where
C = (1− γ)NE − γN¯B .
Note that (A,B,C) is a Gaussian vector, and that A and C are
independent for any γ. The usefulness of the above expansion
comes from the fact that C is also independent of B if γ =
PE
PB
:
E[BC] = (1− γ)E [BNE ]− γ E
[
BN¯B
]
= (1− γ)PE − γ (PB − PE)
= PE − γPB
= 0 .
Finally, since V only depends on A, C is independent of
(V,A,B).
Using expansion (75), we now write
h(E|V B) = h(γB + (1− γ)A+ C|V B)
= h((1 − γ)A+ C|V B) .
And from the above paragraph, the conditional EPI holds
between A and C (given (V,B)):
22h((1−γ)A+C|VB) ≥ 22h((1−γ)A|VB) + 22h(C|VB) .
Since C is independent of (V,A,B), the last entropy can be
written as
h(C|V B) = h(C|AB)
= h(E|AB) ,
where the last equality follows from expansion (75).
Gathering the above equations, (73) yields
∆ ≤ h(A|V B)
− 1
2
log
(
(1 − γ)2 22h(A|V B) + 22h(E|AB)
)
+ h(E|AB)
=
1
2
log
 11
22h(A|V B)
+
(1− γ)2
22h(E|AB)

=
1
2
log
 2πe2πe
22h(A|V B)
+
1
PE
− 1
PB
 , (76)
where the last equality follows from Var [E|AB] =
PE
(
1− PE
PB
)
after some manipulations.
Now, from standard properties of differential entropy, and
from the fact that distortion measure d is the Euclidean
distance on R, the following sequence of inequalities holds
true:
22h(A|V B)/(2πe) ≤ Var [A|V B] ≤ E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
and hence
22I(V ;A|B) =
22h(A|B)
22h(A|V B)
≥ 1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
.
Gathering the above equations, tuple (D,DE) verifies the
following inequalities:
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
D
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
DE ≤ 11
D
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
.
This proves the converse part of Proposition 7.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Assume that PB > PE and PY < PZ , and let (D,DE) be
an achievable tuple. From Theorem 1, there exist random vari-
ables U , V , Q, T , X with joint distribution p(uvqtabexyz) =
p(uv|a)p(abe) p(q|t)p(tx)p(y|x)p(z|y),4 and a function Aˆ,
verifying
I(V ;A|B)≤I(T ;Y ) ,
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] ,
∆≤h(A|UE)−
[
I(V ;A|B)− I(U ;A|B)
−
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
,
Var [X ]≤P ,
where ∆ = 12 log(2πeDE).
From the Markov chain Q−
− T −
−X −
− Y −
− Z , tuple
(D,∆) verifies the following inequalities:
I(V ;A|B)≤I(X ;Y ) , (77)
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V,B))] , (78)
∆≤h(A|UE)
−
[
I(V ;A|B)− I(U ;A|B)− I(X ;Y |Z)
]
+
,(79)
Var [X ]≤P . (80)
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 1 (see (49), (50)
in Appendix C), we can restrict our attention to auxiliary
variables U , V s.t. U −
− V −
− A −
− E form a Markov
chain.
We introduce two parameters: ν = 22h(A|V B)/(2πe), µ =
22h(A|UB)/(2πe). From the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy and classical properties of the differential entropy, the
above parameters are bounded as follows:
ν ≤ µ ≤ 1
1 + 1
PB
. (81)
We now write (77)–(80) as functions of these parameters.
First, recalling that distortion measure d is the Euclidean
distance on R,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B))
] ≥ Var [A|V B] ≥ ν . (82)
Since PB > PE , and according to Remark 2, we can assume
that A−
−E −
−B form a Markov chain. Then, following the
argument of Appendix G (based on expansion (75) together
4Since it is assumed that PY < PZ , according to Remark 2, the Markov
chain X −
− Y −
−Z can be assumed here without loss of generality.
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with the conditional EPI), we can easily prove the following
equation (similar to (76)):
h(A|UE) ≤ h(A|UB)− 1
2
log
(
(1 − γ)2 22h(A|UB)
+ 22h(E|AB)
)
+ h(E|AB)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe
1
µ
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
)
. (83)
Since the Markov chain X −
− Y −
− Z is assumed, (70)
also holds here:
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + P
PY
1 + P
PZ
)
. (84)
Gathering the above equations, tuple (D,DE) verifies the
following inequalities:
ν ≤ µ ≤ 1
1 + 1
PB
,
1
1 + 1
PB
· 1
ν
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
D ≥ ν ,
DE ≤ 11
µ
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
,
DE ≤ 11
µ
+ 1
PE
− 1
PB
· ν
µ
· 1 +
P
PY
1 + P
PZ
.
Eliminating parameter ν and µ proves Proposition 8.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
In this section, we prove a sequence of lemmas which
together prove Proposition 9. To that end, using auxiliary
variables (31)–(33), we show that any tuple (D,DE) verifying
conditions (35)–(38) in Proposition 9 lies in region RPhybrid.
A. Conditional Covariance of Gaussian Variables
The following lemma can be found in [40, Appendix A.2]:
Lemma 6 (Conditional covariance matrix of Gaussian vectors):
Let P , Q be two jointly Gaussian random vectors with
covariance matrix
ΓPQ =
[
A CT
C B
]
.
Then the conditional covariance matrix Γ(P |Q) of P given Q
verifies the following equality
Γ(P |Q) = A− CB−1CT . (85)
From the above lemma, we can easily derive the following
corollary, which gives the conditional variance for two scalar
Gaussian random variables.
Corollary 1 (Conditional variance of Gaussian variables):
Let P and Q be two jointly Gaussian random variables. Then
Var [P |Q] = det ΓPQ
Var [Q]
. (86)
B. Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 7: With definition (32),
I(V ;A) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
α2
γ2
)
. (87)
Proof: From definition (32), the covariance matrix of
(A, V ) is given by
ΓAV =
[
1 α
α α2 + γ2
]
.
Lemma 7 then directly follows from equality
I(V ;A) =
1
2
log
(
Var [A]
Var [A|V ]
)
,
and Corollary 1.
Lemma 8: With definitions (32), (33),
Var [V |BY ] = γ2
1 + 1
PB
+ α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
1 + 1
PB
+ P
PY
(
1 + γ
2
PB
) . (88)
Proof: From definitions (32), (33), the covariance matrix
of (V,B, Y ) is given by
ΓV BY =
 α2 + γ2 α (αβ − γ2)
√
P
α 1 + PB β
√
P
(αβ − γ2)
√
P β
√
P P + PY
 .
This equation comes from the following sequence of equali-
ties, using (34):
E[V Y ] = E[V X ]
=
(
(α+ β)E[V A]− Var [V ] )√P
=
(
αβ − γ2)√P .
Lemma 8 then follows from Lemma 6 after some straightfor-
ward manipulations.
Letting PB tend to zero in the above lemma yields the
following corollary (which can also been proved independently
using similar argument):
Corollary 2: With definitions (32), (33),
Var [V |AY ] = γ
2
1 + γ2 P
PY
. (89)
Lemma 9: With definitions (32), (33),
Var [A|BY ] = 1 + γ
2 P
PY
1 + 1
PB
+ P
PY
(
1 + γ
2
PB
) . (90)
Proof: From definitions (32), (33), the covariance matrix
of (A,B, Y ) is given by
ΓABY =
 1 1 β
√
P
1 1 + PB β
√
P
β
√
P β
√
P P + PY
 .
Lemma 9 then follows from Lemma 6 after some straightfor-
ward manipulations.
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Lemma 10: With definitions (32), (33),
I(X ;Z|E) = 1
2
log
1 + 1PE + PPZ
(
1 + γ
2
PE
)
1 + 1
PE
 . (91)
Proof: Lemma 10 directly follows from Corollary 6
together with equality Var [Y |X ] = PY , expansion
I(X ;Z|E) = h(Z|E)− h(Z|X) ,
which comes from the Markov chain Z −
−X −
−E, and the
following expression of the covariance matrix of (Z,E):
ΓZE =
[
P + PZ β
√
P
β
√
P 1 + PE
]
.
C. End of Proof
We now combine the above lemmas to prove that the
inequalities (20)–(23) and (30) are verified by variables (31)–
(33) under conditions (35)–(38).
As a matter of fact, inequality (20) is verified with defini-
tion (31). From (33) and (39), X ∼ N (0, P ) and the power
constraint (30) is also verified.
1) Proof of (21): From Lemma 8 and equality Var [V ] =
α2 + γ2, I(V ;BY ) can be written as
I(V ;BY )=
1
2
log
(1 + α2
γ2
) 1 + 1
PB
+ P
PY
(
1 + γ
2
PB
)
1 + 1
PB
+ α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2

. (92)
This equality together with Lemma 7 and constraint (38)
proves (21).
2) Proof of (22): In the quadratic Gaussian case considered
in Section IX, distortion measure d is the Euclidean distance
on R:
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))
]
= E
[(
A− Aˆ(V,B, Y ))2] .
Moreover, in the proposed scheme, function Aˆ is the MMSE
estimator of A from (V,B, Y ), therefore
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))
]
= Var [A|V BY ] .
We now use the Markov chain V −
− (A, Y )−
−B to expand
the following conditional entropy:
h(A|V BY ) = h(A|BY ) + h(V |AY )− h(V |BY ) ,
and since the above random variables are jointly Gaussian,
this yields
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))
]
=
Var [A|BY ]Var [V |AY ]
Var [V |BY ] .
Gathering Lemmas 8, 9 and Corollary 2, the above equation
can be written as
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V,B, Y ))
]
=
1
1 + 1
PB
+ α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
,
and hence (22) is verified under constraint (35).
3) Proof of (23): From Corollary 1 with the covariance
matrix ΓAE given below, Lemmas 7 and 10, we can easily
prove the following equality:
h(A|E) − I(V ;A)− I(X ;Z|E)
=
1
2
log
 2πe(
1 + α
2
γ2
)(
1 + 1
PE
+ P
PZ
(
1 + γ
2
PE
))
 . (93)
ΓAE =
[
1 1
1 1 + PE
]
.
Then, letting PB tend to zero and replacing PY by PZ
in (92) yields the following equality (which can also been
proved independently using argument similar to the one
Lemma 8):
I(V ;AZ) =
1
2
log
((
1 +
α2
γ2
)(
1 + γ2
P
PZ
))
. (94)
Inequality (23) then follows under constraint (37)
from (92)–(94) and definition DE = 22∆/(2πe).
This concludes the proof of Proposition 9.
APPENDIX J
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Letting PB tend to infinity, (35)–(38) write
D ≥ 1
1 + α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
, (95)
DE ≤ 1
1 + 1
PE
+ P
PZ
(
1 + γ
2
PE
)
·min
{
1 + P
PY
1 + α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
; 1 + γ2
P
PZ
}
, (96)
α2
γ2
+
P
PY
(α+ β)2 ≤ P
PY
. (97)
We then check that these equations are verified with defini-
tions (42), (43) under constraint (41). Recall that we consider
here any distortion level:
D ∈
[
1
1 + P
PY
,
1 + P
PZ
1 + P
PY
]
.
A. Proof of (95)
From definitions (42), (43), on one hand:
α2 =
γ
2
√
1
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
− βγ2 P
PY
1 + γ2 P
PY

2
= γ4
1
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
+ β2
(
P
PY
)2
− 2β P
PY
√
1
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
(
1 + γ2 P
PY
)2 ,
on the other hand:
(α+ β)2 =
β2 + γ
4
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
+ 2βγ2
√
1
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
(
1 + γ2 P
PY
)2 .
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The denominator in (95) thus can be written as
1 +
α2
γ2
+
P
PY
(α + β)2
= 1 +
γ2
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
+ γ2β2
(
P
PY
)2
(
1 + γ2 P
PY
)2
+
β2 P
PY
+ γ
4
D
P
PY
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
(
1 + γ2 P
PY
)2
= 1 +
γ2
D
(
P
PY
− P
PZ
)
+ β2 P
PY
1 + γ2 P
PY
=
1 + P
PY
+ γ
2
D
P
PY
− γ2
D
P
PZ
1 + γ2 P
PY
, (98)
where the last equality follows from (39).
Now, from definitions (39), (43):
1 + γ2
P
PZ
= D
(
1 +
P
PY
)
, (99)
and hence (98) can be written as
1 +
α2
γ2
+
P
PY
(α + β)2 =
1
D
+ γ
2
D
P
PY
1 + γ2 P
PY
=
1
D
. (100)
This proves (95).
B. Proof of (96)
First, from (99) and (100), the two arguments of the
min{· ; ·} in (96) are equal:
1 + P
PY
1 + α
2
γ2
+ P
PY
(α+ β)2
= D
(
1 +
P
PY
)
= 1 + γ2
P
PZ
Then, from (99) once again, the first term in the r.h.s. of (96)
can be written as
1
1 + 1
PE
+ P
PZ
(
1 + γ
2
PE
) = 1
1 + P
PZ
+ D
PE
(
1 + P
PY
) ,
and since (41) can be written as, for D ≤ 1+
P
PZ
1+ P
PY
,
DE ≤ 1
1
D
· 1+
P
PZ
1+ P
PY
+ 1
PE
,
this proves (96).
C. Proof of (97)
Inequality (97) directly follows from (100) and D ≥ 1
1+ P
PY
.
This concludes the proof of the direct part of Theorem 4.
APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF PROPOSITION 10
Let (D,DE) ∈ RPdigital i.e., such that there
exist random variables U , V , Q, T , X , and a
function Aˆ, with joint distribution p(uvqtaexyz) =
p(u|v)p(v|a)p(ae)p(q|t)p(tx)p(y|x)p(z|y),5 and verifying
I(U ;A)≤I(Q;Y ) ,
I(V ;A)≤I(T ;Y ) ,
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V ))] ,
∆≤h(A|UE)
−
[
I(V ;A|U)−
(
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
)]
+
,
Var [X ]≤P ,
where ∆ = 12 log(2πeDE).
From the Markov chain Q−
− T −
−X −
− Y −
− Z , tuple
(D,∆) verifies the following inequalities:
I(U ;A)≤I(Q;Y ) , (101)
I(V ;A)≤I(X ;Y ) , (102)
D≥E[d(A, Aˆ(V ))] , (103)
∆≤h(A|UE)
−
[
I(V ;A|U)− I(X ;Y |QZ)
]
+
, (104)
Var [X ]≤P . (105)
We now introduce three parameters: ν =
22h(A|V )/(2πe), µ = 22h(A|U)/(2πe), ζ =
22h(Y |Q)/(2πe). Since U −
−V −
−A−
−E and Q−
−X−
−Y
form Markov chains, from the fact that conditioning reduces
the entropy and inequality Var [Y ] ≤ P + PY , the above
parameters are bounded as follows:
ν ≤ µ ≤ 1 , (106)
PY ≤ ζ ≤ P + PY . (107)
We now write (101)–(105) as functions of these parameters.
First, recalling that distortion measure d is the Euclidean
distance on R,
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(V ))
] ≥ Var [A|V ] ≥ ν . (108)
Then, from the Markov chain U −
−A−
− E, we write
h(A|UE) = h(A|U)− h(E|U) + h(E|A) . (109)
Now, since E = A+NE with NE independent of A (and U ),
the conditional EPI [35] yields:
22h(E|U) ≥ 22h(A|U) + 22h(NE) . (110)
Gathering (109) and (110), we obtain:
h(A|UE) ≤ h(A|U)− 1
2
log
(
22h(A|U) + 22h(NE)
)
+ h(E|A)
=
1
2
log
(
1
1
22h(A|U)
+ 1
22h(NE )
)
=
1
2
log
(
2πe
1
µ
+ 1
PE
)
. (111)
5Since it is assumed that PY < PZ , according to Remark 2, the Markov
chain X −
− Y −
−Z can be assumed here without loss of generality.
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From the Markov chain Q−
−X −
− Y −
− Z , there exists
a random variable N˜Z ∼ N (0, PZ − PY ), independent of
(Q,X, Y ) such that Z = Y + N˜Z . Then the conditional
EPI [35] yields:
22h(Z|Q) ≥ 22h(Y |Q) + 22h(N˜Z) .
From the latter equation,
I(X ;Y |QZ) = h(Y |Q)− h(Y |X)− h(Z|Q) + h(Z|X)
≤ h(Y |Q)− h(NY )
−1
2
log
(
22h(Y |Q) + 22h(N˜Z)
)
+ h(NZ)
≤ 1
2
log
(
ζ
ζ + PZ − PY
PZ
PY
)
.
Gathering the above equations, tuple (D,DE) verifies (106),
(107), and
1
µ
≤ P + PY
ζ
,
1
ν
≤ 1 + P
PY
,
D ≥ ν ,
DE ≤ 11
µ
+ 1
PE
,
DE ≤ 11
µ
+ 1
PE
· ν
µ
· 1
1 + PZ−PY
ζ
· PZ
PY
.
Eliminating parameters ζ, µ and removing redundant in-
equalities in the above system prove the converse part of
Proposition 10.
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
Consider any distortion level D ∈
[
1
1+ P
PY
, 1
]
. The analog
scheme of Proposition 11 then consists in sending a scaled
version of the source over the channel:
X =
√
τ A , (112)
where τ = PY
(
1
D
− 1). Note that, since D ≥ 1
1+ P
PY
,
Var [X ] = τ ≤ P and the power constraint (30) is verified.
Bob then simply computes the MMSE estimate Aˆ of A from
Y .
In such an analog scheme, the mean distortion at Bob can
be written as
E
[
d(A, Aˆ(Y ))
]
= Var [A|Y ]
=
PY
τ + PY
= D ,
where the next-to-last equation follows after Corollary 1
together with the covariance matrix of (A, Y ):
ΓAY =
[
1
√
τ√
τ τ + PY
]
.
The equivocation rate at Eve is h(A|EZ) and quantity DE
then can be written as
DE = Var [A|EZ]
=
1
1 + 1
PE
+ τ
PZ
=
1
1 + 1
PE
+
(
1
D
− 1) PY
PZ
,
where the next-to-last equation follows after some straightfor-
ward manipulations from Lemma 6 and the covariance matrix
of (A,E,Z):
ΓAEZ =
 1 1 √τ1 1 + PE √τ√
τ
√
τ τ + PY
 .
This proves Proposition 11.
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